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“This Nation’s heart, say what men may  
 Who butcher Peace and barter Truth,  
Beats true as on its natal day,  
 Beats true as in its battle-youth,  
Beats true to Freedom, true to Truth,  
 Whatever Tories dare to say.  
Of all who fought with Washington  
 One Arnold was and only one.  
Christ chose but twelve, yet one poor soul  
 Sold God for silver. Ever thus  
Some taint, and even so with Us:  
 But Freedom thrills the whole.” 
  —Joaquin Miller, “To Ye Fighting Lords of London Town,” from Chants  
  for the Boer (1900).1 
 
 From 1899 to 1902, the world’s foremost superpower—under the pretext of 
defending “liberty”—engaged two white supremacist republics in the interior of Africa in 
a bitter and destructive struggle for dominance.2  For almost three years—years that also 
witnessed horrific wars in the Philippines and China, the death of Queen Victoria, the 
assassination of an American president and the dawning of a new century—the world 
was riveted to the conflict.  Its scale far surpassed that of other colonial wars: by June 
1902 almost half a million British troops were stationed in southern Africa, striving with 
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limited success to suppress a Republikeinse fighting force probably no larger than sixty 
thousand at its height.3  Thirty thousand farms were burned, and three and a half million 
sheep were slaughtered in the interest of quashing the Republikeinse insurgency. 4  
Twenty-eight thousand white Republikeinse died in the infamous British concentration 
camps, the vast majority of whom were children—yet this is probably at least matched by 
the number of black and colored South Africans thought to have died in camps alone (the 
war’s full death toll being surely much greater).5  To regard it flippantly as “the last of the 
gentlemen’s wars” or even “the last enjoyable war” (to quote Winston Churchill) would 
be a callous error.6  The stakes were high all around.  For the Dutch-speaking white 
citizens of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, it was a fight for political survival 
against a geopolitical behemoth bent on exploiting their mineral wealth and curtailing 
their independence.  For Britain the war was an unpleasant performance under the 
watchful gaze of a mostly hostile world: could the great empire live up to its rhetoric?  
Did it deserve its superpower reputation?  For the disfranchised, coerced and persecuted 
black and colored Africans who made up the majority of southern Africa’s population—
without whose labor a massive land war could never have occurred—the stakes were also 
high.  Surely the union of southern Africa under British administration would mean a 
more enlightened approach to questions of race, land ownership, and political 
participation—at least that was the hope.  The reality, as in so many other things South 
African, was far more complicated. 
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 Americans, despite their distance from the front and a busy domestic news cycle, 
were by no means oblivious to the protean brawl raging thousands of miles away.  In 
December 1901, even as the conflict descended to its gridlocked nadir, John E. 
Milholland (father of the prominent suffrage activist Inez Milholland) could write matter-
of-factly that “in all human affairs I know nothing so important as this War in South 
Africa; so far reaching in its effects upon our advancing civilization”7  As of December 
1899, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt was “absorbed in interest in the Boer War,” 
while two years later at Harvard University, his distant cousin Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
entered the fray as an organizer for the Boer Relief Fund—just one of a dizzying  
profusion of pro-Boer and anti-war organizations formed in the United States while  the 
war raged on.8  Today however, the war has all but disappeared from American collective 
memory, and is unfamiliar even to serious students of American history.  As Byron 
Farwell observed in the preface to his 1977 narrative history The Great Boer War, 
“Americans remember the war but none of its details, and they have completely forgotten 
their own interest and involvement in it.”9  If Farwell’s assessment was accurate in 1977, 
his words ring even truer today, when the South African War (if mentioned at all), is 
treated in collegiate history courses as little more than a remote colonial conflict—
“Britain’s Vietnam”; perhaps even “Britain’s first War on Terror,” but little more.10 
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 This state of affairs is regrettable, not only because ignorance of the impact of the 
South African War on the United States (and vice versa) constitutes such a significant 
lacuna in historians’ understanding of the era, but also because it exemplifies the 
estrangement of American experiences from those of Britain’s other “white colonies”—
not only South Africa, but also Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  To continue 
ignoring America’s role in the South African War is to thwart a meaningful and 
productive investigation into the story of the British-ruled  settlement colony.     
 That latter term—“settlement colony”—frequently used in colonial studies to 
distinguish colonies that promoted white settlement as opposed to indirect exploitation, is 
rarely applied to the United States as an independent country.  Most students of American 
history, however, will acknowledge that the distinction between pre- and post-1776 
America is not so absolute.  Most historians of American slavery, racism, diplomacy, 
immigration and commerce would agree that the independent America of the earlier 
federal period was not built from scratch; rather, it was heavily informed and influenced 
by colonial structures and ideas.11   It is clear, then, that for colonial studies such an 
artificial and (for American scholars) self-centered understanding of the United States 
ought to be cast aside.  Thus when Walter LaFeber speaks of Cuban, Hawaiian and 
Philippine annexation in The New Empire as “a natural culmination” of events, he refers 
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to an American expansionist impulse that was just as “colonial” as it was “imperial.”12  It 
has been a few decades since writers like John Cell and George Frederickson first began 
charting the parallels between the American and South African racial milieux, but their 
admirable work is only a starting point.13  In addition to a comparative mode of analysis, 
bringing America into the settlement colony fold, a connective dimension is necessary—
an acknowledgement that, despite their collective amnesia, Americans of diverse 
backgrounds were consistently in dialogue with their overseas counterparts, working by 
turns collaboratively and contentiously through the challenges of living in an Anglo-
Saxon “daughter state.” 
 This paper is rooted, then, in the premise that the facts of America’s political 
genesis (as a confederation of former settlement colonies on a foreign continent) suggest 
both real and imagined similarities with South African history, similarities that quite 
naturally precipitated dialogue when the time came.  For both emerging nations cultural, 
social, and linguistic heterogeneity was an ineluctable fact.  The Cape Colony, 
established in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company, grew by 1910 to encompass an 
enormous variety of Khoisan-, Bantu-, Dutch/Afrikaans-, and English-speaking 
populations (not to mention the impact of twentieth century African, Indian, and Chinese 
immigration).  Likewise the United States, though politically linked with the 1607 
establishment of Jamestown, united  (in law if not in spirit) the populations of former 
                                                 
12
 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1963): vii. 
13
 See John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa 
and the American South (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1982); George M. Frederickson, 
Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1995); Ibid., White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American 
and South African History (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1981).  In its own way W.A. de 
Klerk’s curious volume The Puritans in Africa: A Story of Afrikanerdom (New York, N.Y.: Pelican, 1976) 
can even fit into this category. 




French, Spanish, Dutch, Swedish, Russian, Mexican, and indigenous polities (again, 
before one even considers the impact of subsequent immigration).  Both South Africa and 
the U.S. carry a burdensome legacy of slavery and official sociopolitical oppression.  
Both territories experienced colonial struggles with the British metropole, and in both 
countries a self-conscious frontier ethos emerged, uniting white supremacist thought, 
elements of Protestant Christianity, and a history of violence against native peoples.   
 An equally crucial premise, apprehended by many of the American protagonists 
of this story, is the fact that the United States of 1895-1905 was quite different from the 
United States of 1776.  To argue that America had “fundamentally” or “essentially” 
changed at some particular point during the nineteenth century is to paint with too broad 
a brush, yet the impact of over a century of independence (not to mention the great shock 
of the American Civil War), meant that the axioms of American self-identity by 1895 had 
become somewhat fragile as the economic and geopolitical stature of the U.S. continued 
to increase.  By 1895, America could be mythically constituted any number of ways: as 
the pious and egalitarian nation of the Pilgrim Fathers, the ethno-racial nation of the 
Anglo-Saxons, the bi-racial union of Lincoln’s second inaugural address, the agrarian 
democracy of Jefferson, the capitalist powerhouse of Cornelius Vanderbilt, or any 
combination thereof.  As American prestige and influence waxed and commentators like 
the British newspaper editor W.T. Stead began to speak of “the Americanization of the 
world,” Americans sought and discovered powerful yet increasingly contradictory 
referents through which to explain their past, present and future.14   
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 The territory that would become South Africa in the wake of the 1899-1902 war 
had also experienced momentous nineteenth century change.  By 1899 it had been 
revolutionized, most directly by a quick succession of mineral booms in which American 
businessmen and mining engineers played a key role.  Long derided as a faraway 
backwater, by 1899 it seemed that southern Africa’s moment had finally come, as 
immigration, industrial capital, and the trappings of urbanity poured into newly-throbbing 
mining camps and cities, a story that might just as well have been set in California, 
Montana, or the Arizona Territory.  All comparisons aside however, by the time war 
broke out between Republikeinse commandoes in the Transvaal and British forces, many 
Americans were quite ambivalent about which side to support.  Notwithstanding the 
war’s possible parallels with the American Revolutionary War, even figures as rugged 
and brash as Vice President Theodore Roosevelt (the scion of a wealthy Dutch-American 
family, no less) approached the crisis with an uneasy circumspection.  Though the U.S. 
government loudly (and disingenuously) proclaimed its equanimity throughout the war, 
for many Americans the trouble in southern Africa made for a restless and confused 
neutrality. 
———  
 Perhaps one reason for the distressing absence of the South African War from 
American historical thought is the rank inadequacy of the tiny core of specialist texts 
which constitute the historiographical bedrock of this subject.15  All is not right when the 
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premier text in a particular sub-field is seventy-five years old.  John H. Ferguson’s 
American Diplomacy and the Boer War was published in 1939, and one searches in vain 
for an English language text to supplant it.  It represents the first attempt at a 
comprehensive study of American policy during the war, and why, specifically, there 
seemed to exist such a disconnect between public opinion (divided, but broadly pro-
Republikeinse), and the pro-British sympathies of the Republican administration, 
notwithstanding official State Department policy.  While Ferguson understands the 
American government’s conduct during the war to be legally proper and ultimately for 
the best, he does not mince words when he observes that “the American government 
acted throughout the war as if in friendly alliance with England, and by doing so did 
much to prevent intervention by European powers, thus assuring the annihilation of the 
Boer republics.”16  While most strongly concerned with the official angle on the subject, 
American Diplomacy and the Boer War includes a useful chapter on the pro-
Republikeinse propaganda effort, noting how the use of propaganda during the war (to 
great effect in Europe, if not quite the United States) foreshadowed the essential role it 
would play in subsequent twentieth century wars—as well as the difficulty pro-
Republikeinse elements faced in spurring the United States towards useful action on their 
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behalf.  Written only a few decades after the war, it is quite understandably a bit dated.  
Ferguson’s greatest shortcoming, however, is his exclusive focus on American archival 
sources for his analysis, missing many useful South African archives, including the 
correspondence of the important American-born Orange Free State consul and activist 
Charles D. Pierce.  It yields “a well-organized, coherent narrative account,” to quote 
William Tilchin, yet at the same time it is “legalistic and time-bound, and its 
interpretations lack insight and imagination.”17  It makes a fine introduction, but cries out 
for something better.   
 In 1978 the diplomatic historian Thomas Noer responded to Ferguson with a fresh 
perspective (if idiosyncratic execution) in Briton, Boer and Yankee: The United States 
and South Africa, 1870-1914; “a curious little book,” according to Shula Marks, “which in 
places betrays and unforgivable ignorance of the basic facts of South African history and 
geography.”18  While still locating the war within the broader process of Anglo-American 
rapprochement following the Spanish-American War, its main innovation concerns of the 
magnitude of American influence in southern Africa in the years leading up to war—in 
both the mining sector and trade generally.19  Without neglecting the British angle, Noer 
attempts the admirable work of turning a spotlight on South Africa itself: not always 
successfully, but often usefully.  Wading into an increasingly loud debate then raging in 
American society over how to approach apartheid South Africa, Noer applies the same 
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dilemma to the late nineteenth century: “Which group in South Africa is most favorable 
to American goals and what methods should be used to support that faction?”20  In Noer’s 
view, the U.S. government’s Anglophilic approach to the region was was a foregone 
conclusion, anticipated as early as the 1870’s in Commodore Robert Shufeldt’s naval 
reports, which derided the Dutch-speaking Transvaalers and Free Staters as “surly in their 
immense farms—never learning and never forgetting anything” and predicted the rise of 
a British-led South African nation  “possessing all of the characteristics and qualities of 
Anglo-Saxon nationalities”—primed for economic expansion and American capitalist 
enterprise (Shufeldt’s son, incidentally, would attain prominence as a white supremacist 
writer, author of such august titles as 1907’s The Negro: A Menace to American 
Civilization).21  By supporting Britain in the war, Noer argues, American elites hoped to 
gain access to a postwar South African bonanza.  Yet the promised payout never came.  
Pre-war American inroads alarmed the British, Noer observes, and American became 
victims of their own success as the new colonial administration enacted protectionist 
laws.  As soon as 1903, when American exports to southern Africa reached an all-time 
high at over thirty million dollars, American trade began to plummet, as “a bitter conflict 
[ensued] between the two English-speaking powers for control of the South African 
market.”22  Not until after World War I would U.S. exports again achieve such success.  
While instructive and illuminating, Noer’s attempt to frame the period in terms of 
Americo-South African rather than Anglo-American relations in the end rather overstates 
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the importance of South African trade.  It is true that many American insiders saw  
southern Africa as an emerging market, but the prospect of future trade was simply not a 
significant factor within broader American discourses (notwithstanding the great 
importance of trade and commerce as an abstract social value, as this paper will show).  
Capitalism was frequently put on trial in the course of the war, but almost always amid a 
broad debate over civilization and values—not public policy. 
 Published in 1994, Richard Mulanax’s The Boer War in American Politics and 
Diplomacy, marked a return to the Fergusonian scheme for writing about the war in 
American life.  Pushing back hard against Noer for arguing that “American interests were 
driven by interests internal to South Africa,” he re-oriented the topic around Anglo-
American rapprochement23  Ultimately however, Mulanax contributes little to challenge 
Ferguson’s general thesis of American diplomatic success, though he accuses others of 
neglecting “the degree of difficulty faced by American statesmen in achieving that 
policy”24  Despite Mulanax’s use of a much wider range of archival material, one is 
inclined to join Tilchin in concluding that Ferguson wrote the better book.  “The 
inadequacies of The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy are so large in 
quantity and so fundamental in nature,” from poor organization and typesetting to 
outright historical errors, “that the book’s value is ultimately very limited.”25  If Mulanax 
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and Louis Changuion (discussed below) really cooperated as closely as the latter claims, 
it is remarkable that works of such disparate quality could have resulted.26 
 Mulanax’s chapters on American politics and public opinion are most relevant to 
this study, yet despite exhaustive research into manuscripts and the journalism of the 
period, his conclusions are as prosaic as Ferguson’s, identifying a clear tension in 
American self image, but doing little to explore or drive home its possible significance.  
Alluding to the shifts in American identity evident in archival sources, Mulanax comes 
closest to the mark when he observes that  
 The craftier moralists demanded policies that, if carried out, risked war, but they 
 did so with the assurance that such policies would never prevail.  Thus they 
 assumed a position of moral righteousness without taking any risks, or so they 
 thought.  The World of 1899 was a much different place than the World of 1897, 
 and policies that were riskless for the United States early in the decade could 
 wreak havoc by the end of the decade.  America had emerged onto the world 
 stage, like it or not.27 
 
Thus while Mulanax’s research is potentially compelling, his arguments ultimately trace 
back to colorless and parochial discussions of American foreign policy, a tendency that 
the literature badly needs to transcend in order to capture the true American significance 
of the war.   
 Perhaps the best attempt to do this is also the most recent: Louis Changuion’s 
2001 Uncle Sam, Oom Paul, en John Bull: Amerika en die Anglo-Boereoorlog.  
Tragically available solely in Afrikaans, it combines the rigor of Mulanax’s source 
material with a broader approach to the events themselves, integrating public opinion, 
official U.S. actions, and Republikeinse propaganda efforts in a lavishly illustrated 
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volume that goes further than any other text in bringing the period to life.  Approaching 
the topic from a self-consciously South African perspective, Changuion quotes C. F. J. 
Muller in arguing that “a thorough and informative South African history cannot base 
itself solely on South African sources.”  “I soon realized,” explains Changuion,  
 that there was much more to say about American involvement, and that other 
 aspects of the subject justified deeper studies that might occupy several volumes.  
 It struck and interested me most that the U.S.A. was able to terminate the war if it 
 wished.  To some extent the same situation existed in the years 1970 to 1989 
 when South Africa was dependent on the U.S.A.’s friendship and support in order 
 to confront an enemy (in this case communism).28 
 
Once again the specter of apartheid-era South Africa is invoked to create continuity 
between distant and recent pasts.  Yet, however one appraises Changuion’s comparison, 
English-only researchers should be advised that his study is an important contribution to 
the field, ignored at one’s own peril.   
Naturally, of course, it has its own shortcomings as well.   While its faithful 
focus on the failure of the American pro-Republikeinse movement and its South African 
organizers to bring about favorable changes in American policy is refreshing and 
productive, that failure deserves further investigation and requires a deeper understanding 
of the late nineteenth century American landscape than Changuion provides.  African-
American perspectives, addressed to some degree in Noer but ignored in other works, are 
also glaringly absent; though published in 2001; the preoccupations of the book bespeak 
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a clear Eurocentric bias as problematic in the American sphere as on the South African 
side of things.  To speak of “American opinion,” moreover, is necessarily misleading: 
one should rather speak of “American opinions” or, better yet, “Americans’ opinions”—a 
phrase that better captures the diversity of the United States at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  Just as the efforts of authors like William B. Gatewood Jr. and Bill Nasson have 
strove admirably to problematize the notion of the South African War as a white man’s 
war, the time has come to desegregate a system that shunts American “black opinion,” 
into a separate discourse.29  To investigate “Americans’ opinions” must mean both those 
of both black and white, acknowledging their disparate outlooks, but ghettoizing neither 
as a special case.30 
——— 
 It is impossible to approach South African history without encountering words 
that are steeped in controversy and patterns of oppression.  It is, therefore, crucially 
important to be deliberate about one’s word choice, and furthermore to be open about that 
deliberative process.  In many cases it would appear that the terminological minefield of 
South African history has left no ideal choices at scholars’ disposal, the 1899-1902 war 
itself serving as a case in point.  In recent  scholarship the term “South African War” has 
risen to prominence over such other names  as the Second Boer War, the Second Anglo-
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Boer War, die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (Second War of Freedom; an Afrikaner nationalist 
label), or, most simply, the Boer War (the “First Anglo-Boer War” of 1880-1881 would 
be rechristened the Transvaal War under such a scheme).  To be sure, the shift towards 
“the South African War” has been a positive development insofar as it excises the 
troublesome word “Boer” from the title and better reflects the widespread and too often 
neglected participation of black, colored (mixed-race), and Indian southern Africans in 
the war.31  While “the South African War” is not without its own faults as a descriptor 
(most egregiously its Anglocentricity, as if it were the only war  ever fought in a “South 
Africa” that legally did not even exist until 1910), it is the name that will be used in this 
investigation outside of quoted sources.   
 This paper’s use of “Republikeinse” to denote the Orange Free State and South 
African Republic in preference to “Boer republics” bears particular explaining.  Unusual 
as it may seem, it seeks to remedy a formidable terminological dilemma.  The word 
“Boer,” whose plain meaning as “farmer” is retained in modern Dutch and Afrikaans, 
was originally used in English to refer pejoratively to the Dutch-speaking settlers who 
left the Cape Colony in the Great Trek of the mid-nineteenth century.  By the 1890’s 
however, the word had been appropriated by the descendants of the Trekboere and was 
the term most generally used to refer to white citizens of the Free State and the S.A.R.  
“Afrikaner” or—more commonly—“Afrikander” was in the 1890’s and 1900’s a newer 
term whose precise meaning had yet to really emerge; in any case it would be imprudent 
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to refer to a conflict between Britons and “Afrikaners” since thousands of the latter lived 
in the British-ruled Cape Colony throughout the war and were generally loyal to the 
Empire.32  By the end of apartheid in the last decade of the twentieth century the war 
“Boer”  again became problematic; rather like the word “redneck” in American English, 
what is still worn as a mark of pride for some conservative Afrikaners for others is a slur 
evoking  the very worst of South Africa’s racist past33  “Republican” would be an 
alternative ill-suited this paper due to its frequent references to the American Republican 
Party.  Therefore Republikeinse, an Afrikaans adjective with the same meaning, is put 
forward instead to distinguish white citizens of the Orange Free State and South African 
Republic as a historical group.  When the word “Boer” is found outside quoted sources, 
most noticeably in Chapter II, it refers to the result of essentialist discourses on the 
Republikeinse people—a construct fashioned from the accounts of writers and 
eyewitnesses pitched towards a captivated American public intent on making sense of the 
situation in southern Africa.  Indeed, the peculiar gulf between the actual Republikeinse 
cause and the various American constructs of “the Boer” stands at the heart of this 
investigation. 
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 This paper is divided into four parts.34  The first chapter, “Manifesting Destinies,” 
concisely presents relevant historical information on the United States and southern 
Africa to 1896, setting the stage for the Jameson Raid and John Hays Hammond trail that 
for many Americans would mark the first time southern Africa had ever entered into their 
consciousness.  Crucially though, the chapter also treats the pre-history of South African-
American relations—a surprisingly complex story stretching all the way back to the 1799 
appointment of John Elmslie as U.S. Consul at Cape Town (and, before even that, to 
colonial era trade).35   Two things will be hopefully be seen clearly as a result:  first, that 
the story of southern African-American relations prior to the twentieth century is not 
simply that of Anglo-American relations on a smaller scale, and second, that even though 
southern Africa would remain obscure to most Americans until the late 1890’s, the pre-
Jameson Raid interests and impressions certain Americans had of southern Africa exerted 
a considerable impact on the subsequent relationship between the two. 
 Secure in these broad foundations, “Uncivilized Whiteness” zeroes in on the years 
leading up to and immediately following the Jameson Raid, delving further into 
American impressions of southern Africa and how those impressions began to shape 
themselves into narratives that would hold throughout the war years.  By focusing on the 
perspectives of people like John Hays Hammond, Ella Graham Agnew, Orpheus 
McAdoo, and Poultney Bigelow (among others), this chapter explores the connective 
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aspect of southern African-American relations, providing insight into how the different 
sides of American got their genesis.  It also begins to tackle the trickiest question 
American observers had to confront: who were the “Boers”?  Even a cursory glimpse at 
American writing from this period—in published sources, newspaper accounts, and 
personal correspondence—reveals that there were any number of different answers.  For 
some, the Boer was an uncivilized barbarian: barely white, certainly not Anglo-Saxon, 
and inviting comparisons to similarly degenerate Ethiopians, American Indians, and Latin 
Americans.  For many others, the Boer was an “ultra-white” embodiment of the 
American ancestral genius: a liberty-loving, privilege-hating figure whose fight against 
the British Empire became a fight for the very soul of Western humanity against malign 
and globally ascendant forces of capitalism and imperialism.  To cast opposition to 
British policy in South Africa as a rebellion against “the modern” is too simplistic, failing 
to account for the ways in which definitions of empire and expansion, imperialism and 
international law, whiteness and civilization were all being debated in the 1890’s and 
1900’s United States—which was, after all deeply involved its own colonial war in the 
Philippines.    
 Chapter III, “Vicksburg, Valley Forge, and Vaal Krantz,” builds upon this 
analysis to focus on American responses to the outbreak of the South African War in 
1899—both pro-British and pro-Republikeinse—occupying itself specifically with the 
important role of historical metaphor in the debate.  The South African War sparked a 
tremendous amount of interest in the United States, manifested in personal letters, 
pamphlets, books, editorials, volumes of poetry, art exhibitions and other means.  
Permeating this voluminous discourse was a constant tendency (no matter what the 




position being advocated), to reframe the conflict through the introduction of referents 
from the American past.  For American opinion makers, the answer to the conflict in 
southern Africa lay hidden within their own history.  For writers like Charles Francis 
Adams, Jr., the Civil War was the natural analogue; for the pro-Republikeinse historian 
Sydney Fisher, it was the American Revolution.  But while debate raged over the finer 
points of historical metaphor, the conclusion became ineluctable that for Americans, the 
South African War was about American self-identity.  For the majority of American 
writers, the reaction elicited was not aggressive zeal for overseas activism, but internal 
activism, soul-searching, and domestic political talking points.  This, the chapter argues, 
was the crucial reason underlying the success of the administration’s softly pro-British 
policies. 
 The last chapter, “Pro-Boers At Bay,” ends this study by examining the American 
pro-Republikeinse movement and tracing how the fundamentally self-centered tenor of 
American debate on the South African War spelt its doom despite considerable pro-
Republikeinse sympathy in the United States, and the perceived uniqueness of America’s 
position.  American pro-“Boer” or pro-Republikeinse organizing represented only one 
face of an international anti-South African War movement (active, most notably, in Great 
Britain itself).  What distinguished the U.S.’s corner of the movement was the widely-
shared conviction that Americans were uniquely able to effect change in British 
policies—a hope continually frustrated by activists’ utter failure to actually do so.  For 
despite continual challenges from pro-Boer elements, the Republican administrations of 
Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt were free to maintain a gently pro-British posture for 
the duration of the war, with no real repercussions.  Why, despite such a large pro-Boer 




element in the United States, was the movement so ineffective?  Writers from Ferguson 
to Changuion have done a fine job decrying the movement’s disorganization and lack of 
focus, but at least two more factors are relevant.  The first is the monopolization of 
firsthand knowledge of southern Africa in the hands of an elite clique of American 
writers and South African visitors, whose goals were not always in congruent with the 
activist movement at the grass roots.  The second was a direct result of self-focused 
American rhetoric—Americans saw too much of themselves in the southern African 
situation and used its example chiefly as a guide to domestic policy and self-identity 
rather than as a call to arms.  Through the instrumental use of the war to shape debate 
over imperialism in America’s present, Americans took ownership of the war in a way 
that fueled their interest and consideration but did not inspire their intervention.  While 
the State Department may have been aware of America’s increasing indispensability on 
the world stage, more Americans were concerned about the changing nature of the United 
States itself.   After outlining tentative conclusions regarding the effect of the South 
African War on American identity, a brief epilogue on South African-American relations 
will conclude the paper. 
———  
 By analyzing the ways Americans rendered faraway events intelligible by means 
of analogy and the construction of historical metaphors, this paper seeks to defend the 
assertion that the full significance of the southern African crises of 1895-1905 to the U.S. 
can be appreciated not only in their impact on American diplomatic history but rather the 
remarkable place they held, however fleetingly, in the American mind.  The war 




disappeared quickly from memory in the United States not because of apathy but because 
American interest in the war was always fundamentally self-centered.   
 In the words of R.W. Johnson, South Africa “has always seemed like a vast social 
science experiment, a theatre in which the rest of the world finds echoes of its own 
struggles.”36  The following is a detailed examination of one such case.  For the most 
part, Americans were interested in the South African War not because they were 
concerned about the world, but because they were concerned about themselves.  The pro-
Republikeinse movement was a failure because it inspired more brooding than action—
thereby establishing a pattern for other internationally-focused activist movements.  Its 
leaders, diverse and energetic as they were, could not transcend this challenge.   
 As Oscar Wilde observed eight years before the South African War in his preface 
to The Picture of Dorian Gray, “the highest as the lowest form of criticism is a form of 
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Chapter I: Manifesting Destinies 
Southern Africa and the United States to 1896 
 
“On my describing the beauties of the countries through which we had passed, and at the 
same time expressing an astonishment at their being unoccupied by christian settlers, I 
was informed, that so desirable an event could never take place, as long as the Dutch 
remained in possession of the Cape.” 
 —Captain Benjamin Stout, from Narrative of the Loss of the Ship Hercules  
 (1798).38 
 
“Flowers without scent,    
 Birds without song,  
Rivers without water, 
 Women without beauty,  
Men without honor.” 
 —Proverb used by Julian Ralph to describe South Africa, from An American With 
 Lord Roberts (1901).39 
 
 In 1796, Captain Benjamin Stout, an American employed shipping rice for the 
British East India Company, was shipwrecked off the South African coast some distance 
from Cape Town, among a “Caffree tribe.”  Having made his way to London by 1798, 
Stout published the story of the wreck and his subsequent journey across southern Africa 
in a volume that would enjoy several printings and eventually be republished in 1820.40  
Praising the country through which he passed as “a second Eden,” Stout was impressed 
by the friendliness of the native people—rumors of their savagery being to Stout “a 
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calumny so undeserved, so atrocious…I cannot suffer to pass without calumny or 
contradiction.”41  At the same time, he was deeply distressed by the lack of agricultural 
development in what he believed to be a fertile and potentially lucrative land. The 1798 
edition of his narrative even includes a passionate appeal to President John Adams in 
favor of establishing an American colony the region, in order to spread the ideals of the 
American Revolution and check the predations of Dutch settlers—“enlightened savages” 
who “hunt the unfortunate settlers as they do the lion or the panther.”42 
 Captain Stout had little success convincing Americans to move forward with his 
proposal, but David Johnson notes that appeals like Stout’s were very much in keeping 
with the missionary spirit of the strident post-Revolutionary era.  The United States, 
having shaken off the British yoke and shocked the world, was keen to spread its values 
abroad.  “A mighty empire takes its birth/ And Heaven asserts the claim,” declared the 
poet-diplomat David Humphreys in his bold 1787 poem “The Genius of America,” part 
of an extensive body of late eighteenth century literature emphasizing America’s 
greatness and its divinely-ordered destiny.43  But if Americans were finally ready to 
spread their ideas around the world, they could look forward only to following the 
already well-trod paths of United States commerce.  Captain Stout was likely one of the 
first Americans in the interior of “Caffraria,” but he was no novelty in Cape Town itself, 
where by 1806 American trade was second only to British trade in value and importance, 
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with American ships comprising over a quarter of all arrivals at Cape Town harbor.44  As 
a natural result of such lively commerce, reports of the Cape periodically made it into 
American newspapers, such as the 1787 account of “an American Gentleman” whose 
experiences with Dutch womenfolk accorded so well to his tastes that “I almost fancied 
myself in a circle of Bostonians, whose elegance of person, dress, and movements will 
ever please.”45  Accounts of South African life written by the European travelers Peter 
Kolbe and the Abbé Raynal were read and circulated, and the disruptions to American 
commerce at the Cape caused by the Napoleonic Wars were also covered in the coastal 
papers.  In late July 1804 (with Cape Town in the hands of Napoleon’s short-lived 
Batavian Republic) the United States’ Gazette proudly reported the availability of that 
most prized of Cape luxuries: “far famed Constantia wine….formerly nearly wholly 
engrossed by the Dutch government, who distributed it in presents to the crowned heads 
and potentates of Europe.”46  The spread of republicanism to Europe and its colonies has 
thus reaped its inevitable and virtuous results: increased trade and welcome 
democratization.  According to the rhetoric, at least, America at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century was out to reshape the world.  The Dutch-cum-British Cape Colony 
constituted a distinct, if minor, arena in that effort. 
 Ultimately, however, American commercial interests in southern Africa were no 
match for global politics, and when the 1807 Embargo Act curtailed America’s (legal) 
trade with foreign ports, the services of Consul Elmslie became unnecessary.  After eight 
years of service, he was recalled—not, as Noer argues, due to the irrelevance of his 
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posting, but as part of a larger trend of souring relations with Great Britain: one that 
would culminate, eventually, in the War of 1812.47  Yet still, the fact remains that though 
the Embargo Act was only in effect for fifteen months, until 1834 the United States 
would have no formal representation at the Cape of Good Hope.  Noer treats this twenty-
seven year hiatus as further proof of the Cape’s irrelevance, but actually it is likely that 
other forces were at work.  According to David Johnson, as early as 1796 British writers 
like Captain Robert Percival and the loyalist American Robert Semple were expressing 
concern over American influence at Cape Town, and mouth-watering reports like Stout’s 
likely aggravated this anxiety.48  A Washington, D.C. newspaper printed a letter from 
Cape Town in 1806 decrying the indignity of British ship inspections there and accusing 
the customs officials of saying that “THE AMERICANS WERE ALL A SET OF 
WORTHLESS DAMNED RASCALS.” 49   Deepening anger at British treatment of 
American shipping thus confronted British disdain for America’s commercial intrusion 
into new imperial territory.  There was more to the recall of John Elmslie and the end of 
the Cape Town consulate than meets the eye. 
 Nevertheless, after the Napoleonic Wars, it is true that the average American 
commanded only a dim awareness of southern Africa.  Aside from scattered missionary 
                                                 
47
 Richard W. Hull, American Enterprise in South Africa: Historical Patterns of Engagement and 
Disengagement (New York, N.Y.: New York University Press): 12-13; Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee, 5. 
48
 Johnson, “African Land for the American Empire,” 114. 
49
 “Extract of a Letter from an American Gentleman at the Cape of Good Hope,” The National Intelligencer 
and Washington Advertiser, May 26th, 1806.  It should be noted that a report of just two days later reports 
the accreditation of Elmslie, “who had remained in Capetown, unaccredited for several years by the 
Dutch,” and commends the British governor, Sir David Baird, for whom “the most prompt attention, and 
gentlemanlike deportment, have always marked his conduct” towards American shipping (“From the Cape 
of Good Hope,” New-York Commercial Advertiser, May 28th, 1806).  Two years later, frustration resumed 
with the closing of the Cape to neutral shipping (The Scioto Gazette [Chillicothe, Ohio], June 20th, 1808).  
These reports, inconsistent as they are, nevertheless fly in the face of the notion of a sedate Cape irrelevant 
to American commerce. 




efforts, and some scant reporting on the progress of the British “1820 Settlers,” 
Americans encountered few dispatches from southern Africa.  Scarcely more is known 
about the attitude of southern African people towards America, particularly the Dutch-
speaking frontier settlers whose periodic rebellions against European rule (in 1795 at 
Swellendam and Graaf-Reinet, in 1801 at Graaf-Reinet once again, and in 1815 at 
Slagtersnek, as well as the non-violent 1778-1787 activism of the “Cape Patriots”) have 
inspired some comparison with American cases.50  However, by the late 1830’s, when 
Dutch-speaking farmers at the Cape began emigrating en masse towards the interior of 
the continent in a bid to escape colonial rule and liberal British post-abolition social 
policies, it is clear that some American ideas were at play.  Images of austere and 
religious pioneer (“voortrekker”) men and women crossing the South African veld in 
covered wagons in due course would cultivate notions of Afrikaner chosen-ness similar 
to American “manifest destiny,” yet even in their own time one perceives some American 
fingerprints.  The Pennsylvania-born Daniel Lindley, originally an American missionary 
among the Zulu people, felt his mission disrupted by the Voortrekkers’ war with the Zulu 
and came to believe that “nothing effectual can be done among the nations should the 
Boers be neglected.”  His travels among the Voortrekkers earned him the honor of being 
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remembered as “the official pastor of the Trekkers,” and a small town in the modern Free 
State province of South Africa still bears his name. 51   Certainly the rudiments of 
republican political thought were also latent in the air.  Pieter Uys’s Voortrekker band 
explicitly committed itself as early as August 1837 to establishing a constitutional polity 
“on the same principles of liberty as the United States of America.”52  How far American 
principles were actually understood is less certain, but Changuion, for his part, imputes to 
Lindley a great deal of credit for the legal shape of the eventual emigrant republics— 
alongside Joseph Orpen, an Irish-American, who two decades later would help draft the 
first Orange Free State constitution. 53   In any case, the apparent similarity of the 
American and the two eventual Republikeinse constitutions (which, among other things, 
explicitly prohibited “equality between the colored and white inhabitants, either in 
Church or State”) would become, decades later, a major talking point for pro-
Republikeinse organizations and activists in the United States.54 
 On the southern African veld, the stage was being set for the great conflicts that 
would mark the latter half of the nineteenth century and provide the crucible in which 
modern South Africa would be born.  On the 7th of February 1838, the trekking party of 
Piet Retief met with disaster as its men were massacred on the orders of the Zulu chief 
Dingaan (the story goes that they were killed following celebration of a peace treaty that 
had recently been signed).  Following a second massacre at the present-day town of 
Weenen (Afrikaans for “weeping”), war broke out between the Zulus and the remaining 
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trekkers, reaching its climax in the December 16th, 1838 Battle of Blood River, in which 
little more than five hundred trekkers and their servants defeated a Zulu force ten to 
twelve thousand strong with no loss of life on their own side and three thousand Zulu 
dead.55  This event, and the religious mythology surrounding it, would be critical in 
marshalling Republikeinse identity in the late nineteenth century as well as later 
Afrikaner nationalism.56  While the true nature of Voortrekker religiosity has been much 
debated, there is evidence even at this early date there was a sense, however amorphous, 
of biblical mission in the emergent Voortrekker consciousness—wandering in the 
wilderness and cleansing the Canaanite Bantu-speakers from what was sure to become 
the Trekboer Israel.  Daniel Lindley himself—the great trekker mentor—referred to his 
flock as “an exceedingly illiterate people,” “ignorant and wicked….members of the 
Reformed Church to which they have a bigoted, rather than intelligent, 
attachment...about as good Christians as the Nestorians.”57 
 After founding and then being compelled to abandon the Republic of Natalia by 
the British in the early 1840’s, the Voortrekkers retreated to the interior plateau, where 
they struggled to establish stable polities in a settler culture where farmers were isolated 
and political sympathies were vehemently anti-government.  Having never recognized the 
weak and divided trekkers’ renunciation of British citizenship, in 1848 the British 
government intervened again through Natal, as Governor Harry Smith declared a huge 
swathe of the southern African interior (including all Voortrekker land and a number of 
Bantu-speaking polities) to be under British authority.  Engaging and defeating a group of 
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trekker commandoes on the Orange River at the battle of Boomplaats, Smith appeared to 
succeed in snuffing out the fifteen year old dream of Trekboer self government.58  But 
victory was pyrrhic, and it soon became clear that the British had bitten off more than 
they were prepared to govern.  In 1852 the Sand River Convention repudiated the British 
advances of 1848 beyond the Vaal and in 1854 under the Bloemfontein Convention the 
Orange Free State was established between Orange River and the Vaal as a fully 
autonomous entity.  Five years later, in 1859, the more distant party of trekkers between 
the Vaal and Limpopo Rivers proclaimed their own state—the Transvaal or South 
African Republic— under the leadership of the old Great Trek patriarch Andries 
Pretorius.  The challenges of governing such a harsh, vast place were obvious, but it was 
not for a few decades that its leaders would learn just how difficult it would be. 
 Despite the fact that this complex drama was playing out halfway around the 
world, for American newspapers dispatches from southern Africa were rare in the mid-
nineteenth century and tended towards the exotic; most expressions of sympathy or 
interest in events there that appeared in American papers were tempered by displays of 
deep ignorance about the actual nature of the country.  Thus the Emancipator and Free 
Liberator of Boston, Massachusetts could endorse the expansion of Port Natal as 
“destined to be attended with the most important results…[We see] no reason why the 
greater part of Africa may not undergo the same changes, which have raised America 
from savage degradation to social happiness and political importance,” without grasping 
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the fact that the Voortrekker presence there largely evaporated with the 1842 reassertion 
of British administration over Natal.59  Until the 1870’s, references to “the Transvaal 
Republic of Madagascar,” were not at all out of place.60 
 Restrained antagonism and great distrust set the general tone of Anglo-
Republikeinse relations for the rest of the century, fueling racializing stereotypes of the 
Dutch-speaking Voortrekker that would persist right up to 1899.  Roualeyn Gordon-
Cumming, a Scot whose account of years spent game hunting in southern Africa in the 
late 1840’s provided a key early source for both British and Americans curious about that 
region of the world, described the white Republikeinse citizens (“burghers” in Dutch) as 
“hospitable to every white stranger,” and “rather partial to Scotchmen” though “they 
detest the sight of an Englishman.”61  Racially, their status as white is obvious, yet at the 
same time the squalor of the average semi-nomadic farmers’ existence presents itself as a 
complicating factor for Gordon-Cumming.  Describing one Hendric Strydom as “a tall, 
sun-burned, wild-looking creature with light sandy hair and a long, shaggy red beard,” 
the Republikeinse mode of living is characterized as dangerously uncouth.62  Gordon-
Cumming frequently describes burgher houses in unpleasant and lurid terms, in this case 
the home of a man named Stinkum: 
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 It being now summer, flies prevailed in fearful swarms in the abodes of the Boers, 
 attracted thither by the smell of meat and milk.  On entering Stinkum’s house, I 
 found the walls of his large sitting room actually black with these disgusting 
 insects…When food is served, two or three Hottentots or Bush-girls are always in 
 attendance with fans made of  ostrich feathers, which they keep continually 
 waving over the food until the repast is finished.63 
 
In this way, even as events in southern Africa reached few on the other side of the 
Atlantic, British notions of “Boer” identity were quietly incubating.  As phenotypically 
white but culturally uncivilized, as arrogantly Christian but theologically ignorant, as 
frontier pioneers afflicted with all the provincial pettiness of the Old World, the “Boer” 
as constructed by early accounts and honed through the wars at the end of the century, 
was full of paradoxes and proved difficult to pin down even as it became clear that the 
Republikeinse burghers were deeply hostile to British influence over their admittedly 
precarious society. 
 During the 1850’s and most of the 1860’s, the British government was content to 
leave the burghers alone as the Transvaal struggled through an abortive civil war and 
continual armed struggles against Griquas and Bantu-speaking groups on their frontiers.  
By 1867, however, everything was about to change.  That year diamonds were discovered 
in what became known as the Kimberley region, near the ill-defined western frontiers of 
the Orange Free State.  In the words of R.W. Johnson, “diamonds changed South Africa 
forever.”64  By 1871 75,000 laborers and businessmen, both black and white, had moved 
to Kimberley, and the rush was on.65  Yet ownership of diamond fields was disputed.  
The territory sitting atop the Kimberley diamonds was claimed by the Cape Colony, both 
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Republics, and the Griqua leader Nicolaas Waterboer, and, with the British government 
acting as arbiter, the land was awarded to Waterboer, a pliant figure who allowed to 
British to declare a protectorate and exploit the area’s mineral resources.  A few 
American newspapers gleefully excerpted sketches of the fields, many of which reflected 
British caricatures of the Boer as self-conscious, racially suspect and uncivilized, such as 
this account of “a reception given by ‘President Brandt of the Transvaal Republic’” : 
 Some of the ‘court ladies’ present appeared to be almost loaded down with  
 diamonds…shown off to their greatest advantage when contrasted with the dark  
 complexions of some of the distinguished female guests from adjoining States.  
 One lady in particular made a special display of the precious jewels…A person 
 might have walked behind her in a crowd and plucked whole fortunes from her by 
 the handful.66 
 
 As revolutionary as the discovery of diamonds in southern Africa was, as a 
dramatic event in the history of the Republikeinse states it pales in comparison to the 
annexation of the Transvaal Republic in April 1877 by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a 
special representative of the Natal Colony.  The reasons for Shepstone’s annexation were 
compelling: the South African Republic had always struggled in relation to the wealthier, 
more cosmopolitan Free State, and was also constantly at war with Zulu and Sotho 
groups on its borders.  Shepstone framed his intervention in Transvaal affairs as a bid 
first and foremost to save white settlement there from being overrun by Zulu attacks, 
though the importance of establishing British preeminence in southern African affairs 
(over both blacks and whites) was doubtless also crucial.  The burghers were fatigued by 
years of civic instability and expressed little real opposition to the move, particularly 
                                                 
66
 “A Diamond Belle in South Africa,” Boston Daily Journal, October 11th, 1870.  It seems unlikely that 
the “distinguished female guests” mentioned were not considered white, if the reception really was by the 
president of the Transvaal.  There is an “Oriental” ostentation to the proceedings, explicitly invoked earlier 
in the article (“marvelous tales, quite throwing in the shade those told in ‘Arabian Nights’”), that deepens 
the impression that Boer civilization is being critiqued. 




because it meant British help in thwarting a Zulu invasion.  Reports of de facto slavery 
persisting in the Transvaal buoyed public opinion abroad in support of the move.   
 Not everyone, however, was quite satisfied.  “SO VERY INNOCENT, YOU 
KNOW,” declared the New York Herald with sarcastic relish as it recounted the 
annexation of the Transvaal,  
 by which a few thousand of the miserable and barbarous South Africans are to be 
 taken into the lap of Britannia, untainted by any of those horribly selfish motives 
 which impel the Muscovites to a desire to annex a country which lies adjacent to 
 its own dominions or which opens up for them a pathway to the sea.67 
 
The Herald was not alone among the American press in expressing unease about British 
expansion in South Africa, but worries over the march of the British empire were soon 
eclipsed by the 1879 outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War, which the annexation had partly 
sought to deter.  At Isandlwana on January 22nd the British suffered a stunning defeat at 
the hands of Cetshwayo’s Zulu forces, though by July they were able to break Zulu 
resistance at the Battle of Ulundi and assert their dominance over Zululand, the fertile 
coastal area east of the Transvaal Republic and north of Natal.68 
 Far from establishing peace however, neutralization of the Zulu threat meant that 
anti-British Transvaalers now felt free to assert their dissatisfaction with re-imposed 
British rule.  On December 11th, 1880 at Paardekraal, a meeting of thousands of 
Transvaal burghers declared the restoration of the South African Republic under a 
triumvirate composed of S. J. P. (Paul) Kruger, Piet Joubert, and M.W. Pretorius.  The 
famous “covenant” said to have been declared on the eve of Blood River was reaffirmed 
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in the form of a cairn monument to “a new determination and a new trusting in God,” to 
quote W.A. de Klerk.69  War was nigh. 
 Against great odds, on February 27th, 1881, Piet Joubert and the Transvaal rebels 
shocked the British with a victory at Majuba Hill, a battle that would resound through 
Afrikaner history for decades to come.  The commandoes’ success in storming the hill, 
which the British commander Sir George Colley believed to be impregnable, effectively 
ended what became known variously as the First Anglo-Boer War, the Transvaal War, or 
die Eerste Vryheidsoorlog (the First War of Freedom).  The British were unwilling to 
fight for land they perceived as worthless anyway, and in August the United Kingdom 
assented to the Pretoria Convention, establishing “complete self-government, subject to 
the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors” in the Transvaal. 70   The 
Transvaal was free to elect a president and pass its own laws, with control over all 
foreign policy matters reserved to the Crown (“suzerainty” was a familiar concept in the 
administration of Indian princely states).71  This treaty was superseded in 1884 by the 
London Convention, which deleted all language of suzerainty but maintained the 
principle (somewhat weakened) of British oversight in the South African Republic’s 
foreign affairs, explaining that 
 The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any State 
 or Nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the 
 eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her 
 Majesty the Queen.72 
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 The terms of the Conventions were embarrassing to Great Britain, but once again 
Britain was unwilling to expend resources to impose dominion over a people whose land 
was seen as largely worthless and whose total suppression would invite the intervention 
of the German Empire or some other sympathetic force and create an international 
disturbance.  President Paul Kruger (widely known as Oom Paul or Uncle Paul, after a 
common Afrikaans honorific) was therefore largely free to govern as he wished, 
notwithstanding the tricky question of whether “suzerainty,” absent from the London 
Convention, had been intentionally removed from the 1884 treaty or was implied by it.  
The diplomatic fortunes of the governments in Bloemfontein and Pretoria seemed to be at 
increasing variance.  Though by 1871 the Orange Free State had already negotiated a 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition with the United States, the Transvaal 
was in no state to conduct international diplomacy on its own in the 1880’s73  In 1872, an 
informal Free State consulate was even established, at Philadelphia under J. Henry 
Riley.74  America’s rejection of a similar treaty with the Transvaal in 1885 signified a 
early and (for Transvaal burghers) disheartening reluctance to offend British interests in 
Africa, but overall in the early to mid-1880’s affairs were at a lull.75 
 That lull shattered and everything changed with the discovery of vast gold 
deposits in the Transvaal in 1886.  Giliomee’s bold declaration that “never before in 
world history had a mineral discovery so suddenly and dramatically, and so utterly, 
transformed an obscure rural backwater,” does not seem so hyperbolic in light of the 
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bloodshed and suffering that was soon to follow.76  Just eight years later, the South 
African Republic (more specifically the goldfields of the Witwatersrand) would be 
responsible for one fifth of the world’s total gold production.77  Yet in 1900 there are 
estimated to have been only about three hundred thousand white Republikeinse men, 
women, and children living in the Transvaal and Orange Free State combined.78  By the 
1890’s, one hundred thousand people, only a small fraction of whom were Republikeinse 
burghers, were involved in the Rand gold-mining industry.79  Fifty thousand whites, only 
six thousand of whom were Transvaal citizens, found themselves living in Johannesburg 
(the queen city of the Rand boom) by the eve of the Jameson Raid.80 
 Unsurprisingly, in keeping with what had occurred in Kimberley years earlier, 
spearheading the development of the Rand goldfields were British capitalists and 
speculators.   Of these savvy businessmen none was more prominent and controversial 
than Cecil John Rhodes, the son of an English clergyman who arrived in South Africa in 
1870 when he was just seventeen years old.  “Possessed of an energy so inexhaustible 
that to the ordinary man he must have seemed almost a demon,” he had already accrued a 
diamond fortune on the Kimberly by 1880, and the next year secured a seat in the Cape 
Parliament where he allied with the dominant “Cape Dutch” political faction, the 
Afrikaner Bond, and gained a reputation for friendliness towards Dutch-speaking 
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whites.81  Joining forces with the other financial giants of the Cape Colony, like Alfred 
Beit and Barney Barnato, Rhodes succeeded in consolidating the mining operations in the 
region and, by 1891, his De Beers Consolidated Diamond Corporation controlled ninety 
per cent of all diamond production in the colony.82  After becoming premier of the Cape 
Colony in 1890, Rhodes became increasingly interested in both the territory and mineral 
resources of the Transvaal, just as President Kruger’s government began desperately 
enacting measures to preserve burgher power in the midst of what most Republikeinse 
citizens regarded as an onslaught of Uitlanders (foreigners).  It was this multivalent 
struggle of interests: avaricious British enterprise against corrupt Republikeinse 
government, burgher versus Uitlander, farmer versus miner, Kruger versus Rhodes, that 
would set the Transvaal on its crash course with the British Empire—manifesting itself 
first in the infamous 1896 Jameson Raid, an incident through which large numbers of 
American eyes were for the first time riveted to events playing out at the bottom of 
Africa, and then finally in the South African War, a conflict whose outcome would 
directly shape the future of Africa’s southern tip for almost a full century after the guns 
fell silent. 
——  
 Trite as it may sound, for the people of the United States the late nineteenth 
century was a period of momentous transition.  One common term associated with the 
period, Reconstruction, is most closely associated with the American South in the years 
immediately following the Civil War.  Yet post-Civil War “reconstruction,” interpreted in 
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a broad sense, was far more than a governmental program foisted on the defeated 
American South by a particular political faction.  In recent years many historians have 
suggested that Reconstruction is a useful term for invoking the whole momentous process 
by which America rebuilt itself as both state and nation in the years leading up to “the 
American century.”  While 1877 has traditionally been used to mark the end of the 
Reconstruction era (as the year of the Hayes-Tilden electoral dispute and subsequent 
compromise), more recent scholarship by authors like Heather Cox Richardson have 
approached Reconstruction as much longer process affecting the entire country right up 
to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and beyond.  As black Americans 
adjusted to the harsh realities of second-class citizenship, white Americans in particular 
sought to transcend their complicated history not only by reasserting their racial privilege 
but by a redoubled commitment to expansion in multiple spheres: spiritual, economic, 
diplomatic, and militaristic.  As Jackson Lears observes, 
 Longings for rebirth had a rich and complex history: rooted in Protestant patterns 
 of conversion, they also resonated with the American mythology of starting over, 
 of reinventing the self.  After the Civil War, the entire country was faced with the 
 task of  starting over.  The idea that the Union has reaffirmed its very being 
 through blood  sacrifice promoted a postwar dream of national renewal through 
 righteous war…political leaders in both sections refined the [Civil W]ar as an 
 epic expression of Anglo-Saxon martial virtue.83 
 
 The Civil War dealt an enormous blow to white American identity, and far from 
spreading the conventions and values of Northern free labor to the South as many anti-
slavery Northerners had hoped, in some ways it reinforced differences in the economic 
systems of the two regions by precipitating to a Northern boom and a severe Southern 
economic depression.  While in the North crop values skyrocketed 103 per cent during 
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the war, by 1865 fully half of the farm equipment in the South had been destroyed.  The 
huge sums Southern farmers and planters had invested in enslaved persons and their 
domestic trafficking evaporated rapidly.  Southern manufacturing, never much to begin 
with, was utterly crippled.   It would not be until 1910 that Southern livestock numbers 
would again approach 1860 levels.84  Factoring in threats to antebellum Southern social 
structures, huge rates of white male mortality, and the authoritarian system of military 
administration instituted by the Radical Republicans in Congress, the signs did not seem 
to presage a tidy process of reconciliation. 
 For both black and white Americans, urbanization and industrialization roared 
ahead in the years after the Civil War, disrupting traditional ideas of America as a 
fundamentally agricultural nation, and threatening traditional notions of what was meant 
by “American freedom.”  Wage labor was no longer “a stop on life’s journey” for 
millions of American city dwellers—it was instead the endpoint, an emerging norm.85  
Traditional liberal doctrines emphasizing the importance of land ownership and personal 
autonomy seemed anachronistic to many elite “native Americans” concerned about the 
influence of working class labor unions and immigrant-led political machines in Northern 
and Midwestern cities, movements which to them seemed to prove the ultimate 
incompatibility of such groups with a traditionally “democratic” society.   
 Accounts of civic treachery in the South—carpetbagger Republicans paying 
freedmen for their votes, while Democrat-sponsored Ku Klux Klan terrorists sought to 
repress them—are familiar to students of American history, but less widely recognized is 
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the extent of anti-democratic systems practices in the country at the time.  Democracy, 
just as in southern Africa, proved for many to be a sad mirage.    Influenced by the 
emergent doctrines of scientific racism, Anglo-Saxon supremacy and social Darwinism, 
the political culture of the post-Civil War era reflected the concerns and insecurities of 
society at large.   At the statewide level, redistricting schemes left over from before the 
Industrial Age ensured that Rhode Island’s twenty-eight smallest towns—less than ten 
per cent of the state’s population—elected almost three-quarters of the state senate.86  In 
Connecticut, just one state over, the city of New Haven was accorded the same number of 
state representatives as the tiny village of Union, despite boasting almost eighty-six 
thousand more residents (Union claimed less than five hundred).87  Fraud also existed at 
the local level, and in rural areas:  in one rural Ohio county it was discovered that 
“eighty-five per cent of the electorate had either bought or sold votes between the 1870’s 
and 1910, when a crusading judge and magazine exposés…forced a stop.”88  In addition, 
the introduction of voting by secret or “Australian” ballot furnished new opportunities for 
both fraud and voter suppression, making it more difficult and embarrassing for the 
illiterate to vote and driving down voter turnout rates to the low levels familiar in modern 
American elections.89  It is curious, therefore, that in 1896 when white Americans found 
themselves debating the Jameson Raid and the question of whether Uitlanders in the 
Transvaal should have the right to vote, their discussions usually avoided the fact that 
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suffrage in the United States was itself a threatened institution and a complex issue—and 
not just in Dixie’s ruined plantation counties. 
 This sketch of American history in the decades before the southern African crises 
is by no means comprehensive.  Between Appomattox and the Maine incident of 1898 
were many important incidents and turbulent periods impossible to treat here 
comprehensively.  This is particularly true as regards the experiences of African-
Americans and other marginalized groups, whose various takes on “American-ness” and 
the elite discourses of the time are nuanced and often difficult to assess.90  Implicit in the 
very nature of the reconstructive task was the need to build up narratives to render a 
complex and muddled past intelligible.  In recent decades historical scholarship has 
discredited many such narratives—the failure of Radical Reconstruction, the 
effectiveness of the Homestead Act, and the success of the Progressive Movement being 
among the most significant.91  Any scholar wading into this period of American history 
should appreciate its full complexity and approach grand narrative approaches to it with 
the utmost caution.  In many ways, America was putting forward a façade. 
 By the 1890’s, among many in the “native American” elite (a rhetorical construct 
neither fully inclusive of nor actually limited to American-born citizens) there was a 
mounting sense of unease regarding America’s future trajectory.  Though the U.S. was 
surely growing, immigrant blood and phenomena like urbanization and the closing of the 
West seemed to be changing America’s basic fabric as a nation formerly removed from 
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the concerns and conflicts of Old Europe.  For better or worse, it seemed that the time 
had come to put away childish things.  In the words of Francis Walker (writing in 1892), 
“No longer can a continent of free virgin lands avert us from the social struggle which the 
Old World has known so long and so painfully.”92  Some white elites came to be known 
derisively as “Mugwumps” for their aloof detachment from the two party system and 
their increasing lack of faith in democracy itself.  Decrying the simultaneously rising 
tides of American materialism, jingoism and populism, the Massachusetts-born editor and 
Mugwump intellectual Charles Eliot Norton lamented in 1896 that “it is hard to have the 
whole background of life grow darker as one grows old.  I can understand the feeling of a 
Roman as he saw the Empire breaking down, and civilization dying out.”93  In February 
1900 the German-American senator Carl Schurz alluded to the same concerns in an 
address her delivered at Philadelphia: 
 What a democracy, based upon universal suffrage, like ours needs most to insure 
 its stability is an element of conservative poise in itself.  This can be furnished 
 only by [faith  in institutions]….popular reverence for high ideals and 
 traditions…[and respect for the Constitution].  Take away these conservative and 
 ennobling influences, and the only motive forces left in such a democracy will be 
 greed and passion.  I can hardly imagine any kind of government more repellent 
 than a democracy that has ceased to believe in anything.94 
 
 Literary figures as diverse as Francis Parkman, Mark Twain, and Edward Bellamy 
each spent time exploring cures for what they perceived to be failures of late nineteenth 
century society, in works that often questioned the foundation of republican government 
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itself. 95    Amid this period of soul-searching and as a response to the frenetic 
contemporary environment of immigration, corruption, exploitation, unrest and avarice, 
the years leading up to 1900 also incubated what today is known as the Progressive 
Movement.  Indeed, the emerging progressive vanguard would have much to say 
regarding America’s duty towards southern Africa. Before exploring such things 
however, this chapter must briefly introduce two further phenomena: imperialism and 
Anglo-Saxonism.  
 It is not by accident that previous historiographical work on America and the 
South African War has focused so heavily on Anglo-American relations: the ties of 
affinity between the United States and Britain during the period were not merely 
diplomatic, but cultural, racial, and quite self-conscious.  Influenced by social Darwinism 
and the Spencerian notion of “survival of the fittest,” in the late nineteenth century the 
paternalistic rhetoric of racism in previous decades was superseded by a racialist vitalism 
that was vehement, narrow, and combative, clustered around the articulation of a mythic 
“Anglo-Saxon” identity.  Writers and commentators repeatedly extolled the virtues of a 
refined and fictive Anglo-Saxon civilization, while developing at the same time a kind of 
fetish for “primitive,” primal vitality, the necessity of war as an “instrument of natural 
selection,” and racial suffering as “the fiery crucible out of which comes the finer metal” 
(to appropriate in the words of Karl Pearson, a popular British Anglo-Saxonist). 96  
Geopolitical life through a vitalist lens was an unceasing struggle between racial-national 
organisms, and the Anglo-Saxon race—with its history of world leadership in conquest, 
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commerce, religion, and civic thought—was destined inevitably to increase and expand 
until, as the historian John Fiske prophesied in 1880, “four-fifths of the human race will 
trace its pedigree to English forefathers, just as four-fifths of the white people in the 
United States trace their pedigree today.”97  Despite complicating elements—such as the 
American Revolution, the War of 1812, unhappiness with Britain’s posture during the 
Civil War, and disputes with Britain over land and borders in both Venezuela, Alaska, 
and the Pacific—by the 1890’s many on both sides of the Atlantic began to see 
cooperation as an obvious and natural response to an intuitively inferior but increasingly 
hostile and dangerous European continent.   
 According to Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 essay, 1890 marked the 
closing of the great frontier and “the closing of a great historic movement.”98  American 
military expansion, however, was only gearing up.  Attending the new vitalist and Anglo-
Saxonist discourses, the 1890’s saw the growth of a new and more positive understanding 
of what overseas imperialism was and could be for Americans.  Though hotly contested 
and debated every step of the way (opposed most vehemently by Mugwumps and 
Progressives—for different reasons), America expanded beyond its coastlines.  In 1893 
American businessmen participated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy; by 1898 
Hawaii had become a territory of the United States.  After interventions early in the 
decade in Nicaragua and Chile, 1898 was also the year the McKinley administration with 
tacit British support waged its “splendid little war” against Spain, seizing Cuba, Puerto 
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Rico, and (at considerably greater cost) the Philippines for what seemed to many to be a 
new American empire.99  Following Rudyard Kipling’s passionate appeal (published just 
a few months prior to the outbreak of hostilities in southern Africa), by 1899 America 
was boldly taking up the white man’s burden in ways it never had before—but to what 
end?  It was amid this exhilarating, disorienting atmosphere, marked as much by bravado 
as by ambivalence that Americans would find their attention riveted to a far-off southern 
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Chapter II:  Uncivilized Whiteness 
Race, Civilization, and Initial American Discourses on the South African Question 
 
 
“Taxation without representation was cause revolution.  Twenty thousand burghers 
established oligarchy denying all rights citizenship to two hundred fifty thousand aliens.  
Remonstrances and petitions to Volksraad ignored.  Reform Committee of many 
nationalities sought reconstruction government on lines truer democracy…No bloodshed 
was general sentiment Americans…” 
 —Consular Agent J.C. Manion to the New York Journal, telegram, January 24th, 
 1896, from Johannesburg, South African Republic.100 
 
“Then…we were in a continual state of excitement caused by the wars & rumors of war 
in the Transvaal.  We never knew what a day would bring forth…Everything is rather 
quiet now.  The Matabeles are being overcome & everybody is anxiously awaiting the 
news as to the Reform Prisoners, many of whom have been…released.  The sentence of 
the four leaders has not been decided upon.  One of them is a countryman of ours, as you 
know.  He is in very poor health just now but is kept safely in jail.” 
 —Ella Graham Agnew to her sister Mattie, May 27th, 1896, from Wellington, 
 Cape Colony.101 
 
Born in San Francisco in 1855, just a few years removed from the time when the city was 
“no more than a heterogenous collection of huts and canvas shelters,” John Hays 
Hammond was a child of the frontier.102  His father, Major Richard Pindell Hammond, 
had been ordered to the fledgling city’s artillery garrison in 1849—at the leading edge of 
the Gold Rush—and his mother Sarah Lea, recently widowed and with a daughter in tow, 
followed soon after by ship across “the pestilential jungles” of Panama.103  Though the 
city of Hammond’s childhood had refined itself significantly by his adolescence (helped 
along the way by frequent fires) it was still very much a rough and tumble mining town.  
In his memoirs he had many reasons not to draw comparisons with Johannesburg and his 
                                                 
100
 J.C. Manion to the New York Journal, telegram, January 24th, 1896, U.S. Consular Records: 
Johannesburg, South African Republic, v. 40, National Archives and Records Administration, Adelphi, Md. 
101
 Ella Graham Agnew to Martha Agnew Hughes, May 27th, 1896, Ella Graham Agnew Papers (Acc. 
42285), subseries I.I, folder 2, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Va. 
102
 Hammond, The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond, v. 1, 4 
103
 Ibid., 5. 




experiences in the Witwatersrand mining area; nevertheless San Francisco’s bustle, 
diversity, and youth clearly played a role in shaping Hammond’s future sympathies.104 
Immersed in stories of adventurous ancestors—particular those of his uncle, the Texas 
Ranger Colonel Jack Hays—he and his siblings became obsessed early on with charting 
new territories.  “Explorers’ blood was so strong in my brothers and myself,” Hammond 
would later explain, “that there was always a rivalry as to which of us had been in the 
greatest number of counties in California…The entrance into each new county provided 
us with a thrill as great as that…[of]…Balboa…when from the heights of Darien he first 
saw the great Pacific.”105  His interest in mining was first piqued by watching Chinese 
workers near his home, and was cultivated by his well-to-do parents.  He was sent to Yale 
for an education, and then to the Königliche Sächsische Bergakademie in Freiburg, 
Germany where he received a first-class education in the principles of mine engineering.  
It was also in Freiburg that he first met Gardner F. Williams, another ambitious young 
American destined to make a fortune in the diamond fields of Kimberly. 
Hammond went home the American West immediately after graduating to begin his 
mining career.  Shortly after his return, his autobiography recalls a remarkable moment: a 
childhood sighting of John Sutter in San Francisco, the pioneer on whose land in 1849 the 
California “mother lode” had originally been discovered.  Hammond remembers his 
feelings of pity for the defeated old man whose intention had always been to farm: 
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He was a broken man, although in Forty-nine he had owned two Mexican grants 
of land, comprising six hundred thousand acres of fields and vineyards, together 
with mills, workshops, stock, and fine horses.  Though he himself had no interest 
in the gold, he had been kind and generous in his hospitality to the ruthless gold-
seekers.  They had swept in upon him like swarming locusts laying waste his 
beautiful estate.  He was now without an acre, although the recipient of a pension 
of three thousand dollars a year from the state.  All he wanted, however, was his 
land; and his land he never recovered.106 
 
Despite the pathos of this brief interlude, Hammond’s convictions are clear: such was the 
grim future in store for any hapless agriculturalist—American or African—whose fields 
happened to lie atop precious minerals. Progress would inevitably claim its victims.  
However pitiful Sutter’s fate, it did nothing to deter Hammond in his quest to become one 
of the Western hemisphere’s most prominent mining engineers.  And that is precisely 
what he did; in Minas Nuevas, Mexico, Colombia, British Honduras, and Idaho 
inspecting possible mineral fields and working to prevent strikes, he built up a fine 
reputation.  The Randlords took notice.  Disillusioned by the election of the Democrat 
Grover Cleveland to the presidency in 1892, Hammond first traveled to southern Africa 
at the behest of Barney Barnato, who offered him the chance to oversee his properties on 
the Rand.107  Hammond and his family arrived in the South African Republic in the fall 
of 1893, and found it an agreeable, if expensive assignment.  Johannesburg was a curious 
place, but Hammond was eager to commend its good order and relative civilization.  As 
Hammond’s memoirs explain, “the majority of the Uitlanders—as we foreigners were 
called—were law abiding substantial citizens by temperament, and most of us were 
accompanied by our families.”108 
                                                 
106
 Ibid., 93-94. 
107
 Ibid., 199. 
108
 Ibid., 207. 




It was not long before Hammond made his first contact with Cecil Rhodes at his famous 
Cape estate, Groote Schuur, and it was not long before he was hired as the chief 
consulting engineer for the Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa, reporting directly 
to the man himself.  He became a close friend and associate of Rhodes, and occupied his 
time in drafting mining regulations for the British South Africa Company (also known as 
the Chartered Company), Rhodes’s enterprise for the exploration and exploitation of the 
land north of the Transvaal.  This was terrifically important to Rhodes, for if colonizing 
“Rhodesia” was a success (and Rhodes hoped would yield even greater wealth than the 
Rand) the deepening rivalry between burgher and Uitlander in the South African 
Republic could be made irrelevant.  In the autumn of 1894 Hammond joined Rhodes, Dr. 
Leander Starr Jameson (of coming infamy), and the soon-to-be famous American scout 
Frederick Russell Burnham in surveying Rhodesian lands recently opened up as a result 
of a recent war against the Mashona.  Hammond adopted a decidedly pessimistic attitude 
and warned Rhodes not to harbor any illusions about Rhodesia’s potential—hardly what 
his boss wanted to hear—but was kept on as a trusted associate.  In 1895 he devoted most 
of his time to an innovative and successful deep-level mining initiative.  “Little of my 
time had been devoted to politics,” as Hammond later explained it. “I had been listening 
to the Uitlander grievances—they were the inevitable topic of conversation at every 
dinner table.  I was sympathetic, of course, but not actively interested.” 109   Soon, 
however, all of that would change. 
Hammond was by no means an everyman, but his pre-Jameson Raid story exemplifies in 
many ways the experience of white Americans in South Africa during the 1890’s.  
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Americans had an vastly outsized influence on the British mining enterprise; they were 
small in number, but greatly sought after for their skills honed in the American West.  
Indeed, if the old West could no longer be found within the United States, one could 
argue that it still existed on the Rand.  Many of the Americans who became fighters in the 
South African War—whether for Britain or the Republics—carried like Hammond a 
particular understanding of the American frontier experience.  Keenly aware, of the 
apparent closing of the American frontier, they understood frontier expansion as a 
positive (though sometimes cruel) necessity.  Growing up alongside remnant 
communities of Californios, Tejanos, and Native Americans, they romanticized the past 
but saw United States migration and settlement as inevitable and ultimately for the best.  
Ultimately, then, for these frontier folk a great deal hinged on the identity of the 
Republikeinse “Boers,” sparking a debate that would rage both in Africa and at home.  
For if southern Africa was a new frontier, who were the Republikeinse?  Were they 
cowboys, Indians, or something in between?  Did British enterprise and cosmopolitanism 
threaten their rugged, wholesome spirit, or did they offer a badly-needed corrective to 
their degeneration?  As Americans witnessed the Jameson Raid and South African War 
transpire far away, they encountered and wrestled with this difficult question in a variety 
of ways, for to many it seemed to represent as much a challenge to the American as the 
African status quo. 
——  
 As early as 1891, American newspapers were picking up isolated tidbits about 
goings-on in far off southern Africa.  Drawing attention to President Kruger’s austere 
Calvinism (he was a working Dutch Reformed pastor in addition to his duties as 




Transvaal chief executive), the Omaha World Herald printed an item in August 
lampooning his opposition to dancing as a pagan practice and requesting the organizers 
of a Johannesburg ball to remove his name from a list of patrons.110  In April 1895 an 
African-American newspaper in Cleveland recounted a similar episode in which he 
compared “one of the most gifted singers of Bloemfontein” to a “she-wolf.”111  Would 
that tensions between burghers and Uitlanders on the Rand were limited to such 
frivolities: by the middle of the decade American newspapers were beginning to catch on 
to the storm clouds darkening the land in that part of the world.  In May 1895 the New 
York Herald reported in some depth on the international outcry over Britain’s plans to 
annex Tongaland, effectively stifling any hope that the South African Republic would 
ever extend to the sea.  British methods, according to the Herald, were explicitly 
punitive, and the report quoted a London paper in stating that “if the Boer chose to treat 
the Uitlander—the immigrant alien—with common fairness we should have no reason to 
check his seaward aspirations,” but, as it is, “a Boer port…would only be an engine for 
harassing and squeezing the trade of the Uitlander.”112   
 Meanwhile, the United States was becoming increasingly irritated by an ongoing 
border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, a crisis situation that bore a 
striking resemblance in some ways to that of the Rand.  At the time, just across the 
Caribbean from Cuba, an unstable and indebted Venezuelan government was contending 
with the British Empire for, among other things, the Yuruari goldfields—“one of the 
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wealthiest gold stores on the continent” according to Walter LaFeber.113  Secretary of 
State Richard Olney, a vigorous believer in America’s expansionist destiny, acted 
decisively to insure America’s continued access to South American markets in the face of 
unwelcome British intrusion into the hemisphere, a hard line that resulted in President 
Cleveland’s famous message of December 17th, 1895 (just a few days before the Jameson 
Raid’s ignominious unfolding).  Any illegitimate territory held by the British in 
Venezuela, according to Cleveland’s statement, constituted “willful aggression” upon 
America’s own “rights and interests,” implying that the administration would not shrink 
from war in the cause of defending its expansive interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 114   Unwilling to escalate the situation (indeed, mindful of the potential 
consequences of Americann ill-will for other imperial initiatives), the British submitted to 
arbitration and eventually about ninety per cent of their claim was upheld. 
 In early 1895 a group of disgruntled Uitlanders in on the Rand had organized the 
Johannesburg Reform Committee, electing John Hays Hammond as its chairman.  
Notwithstanding the paucity of Americans on the Transvaal at the time (only 1,500 by 
Noer’s estimate; just two per cent of the total white population), their outsized influence 
on the mines themselves translated over into outsized political stature.115  It was not the 
first effort at Uitlander organization to be undertaken in the South African Republic (the 
working class Transvaal National Union of J.W. Leonard had existed since 1892), but it 
enjoyed the powerful patronage of Cecil Rhodes and the British Colonial Office, who by 
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the summer had decided on covert military intervention in the Transvaal.116  Pro-Reform 
Uitlanders and their burgher allies organized primarily to protest suffrage policies (the 
Transvaal after 1890 required a full seventeen years of residency for the privilege of 
voting for the First Volksraad), as well as Dutch-only education laws and attempts to 
conscript foreign nationals in wars against native peoples.  For their leaders the creation 
of a favorable money-making environment on the Rand was always the ultimate objective 
in mind—political stability, low taxes, and secure access to unskilled black labour.117 
 Increasingly convinced negotiation with Kruger’s government was useless, 
through the fall of 1895 Hammond, Gardner Williams, and their British patrons oversaw 
the shipment of arms to the Witwatersrand, providing “insurance” for what they hoped 
would be a bloodless revolution.  After first rising up to occupy their urban stronghold of 
Johannesburg, the Uitlanders would subsequently request aid from Dr. Jameson, who 
would already be waiting in the Bechuanaland Protectorate just to the west with a party 
of troops.  The only disagreement among the Reformers was the serious dilemma of 
whether the Transvaal Republic should be merely reformed or abolished altogether—the 
tricky question of whether the Union Jack should be raised in Pretoria or not.  Hammond 
and his American fellows, though supportive of the rest of the plan, balked at its 
occurring under explicitly British auspices.  In the words of the American mining 
                                                 
116
 Ibid., 10. 
117
 The South African Republic’s Volksraad (parliament) after 1890 created a “Second Volksraad” to 
oversee municipal affairs in the mining areas where Uitlanders were a majority of the white population.  An 
oath of allegiance and a five year residence period empowered male Uitlanders to vote for that body, while 
to stand as a candidate one had to be thirty years old and a seven year resident.  The more stringent 
seventeen year requirement applied to the First Volksraad, which was responsible for the whole country 
(ibid., 9).  For more on conscription and the role native wars played in feeding Uitlander discontent, see 
Tlou John Makhura, “Another Road to the Raid: The Neglected Role of the Boer-Bagananwa War as a 
Factor in the Coming of the Jameson Raid, 1894-1895,” Journal of Southern African Studies 21.2 (1995), 
257-267. 




engineer Thomas Mein, “if this is a case of England gobbling this country up, I am not in 
it.  Otherwise, I am up to my neck in it.”118  It was only upon receiving disingenuous 
assurances from Rhodes that the British flag would not be flown that the Americans 
acquiesced.  Rhodes was neither honest nor very pleased with his pledges—he secretly 
feared America as a potential competitor for influence over southern Africa in the long 
run—but he did what he felt he had to for the “aid expedition” to be a success.   
 The uprising did not go as planned, and ended up an utter disaster.  British 
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, keen to avoid offending the United States in the 
wake of Cleveland’s December 17th message, instructed Rhodes to call off the whole 
thing, but his words were unable to reach Jameson in time, who, having cut all the 
telegraph lines in his area, burst forth from Bechuanaland on December 29th.  The 
Reformers in Johannesburg, though quite surprised, dutifully upheld their end of the 
bargain.  “You can rely on me to shoot any man who hoists any flag but the Boer flag,” 
Hammond blustered with faux Transvaal patriotism, and on December 31st a meeting of 
Americans at Johannesburg voted 495 to five to support Jameson and organize a “George 
Washington Corps” to help seize the city.119  The Transvaal government had risen to the 
occasion, however, and on January 2nd Jameson and his men were apprehended at 
Doornkop, about twenty miles southwest of Johannesburg.  With Jameson’s capture, the 
plot was thwarted, and the whole Uitlander community was in uproar over the future of 
the Rand; Hammond reports that, in the unsettled atmosphere following Doornkop, the 
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condition of the Johannesburg reformers was “a combination of Armageddon and a 
psychopathic ward.”  In due course Transvaal soldiers reoccupied the region.120  On 
January 9th, 1896, Hammond and six other Johannesburg Refomers were arrested as 
“chief offenders, ringleaders, leaders [and] instigators” of “the rebellion at Johannesburg 
and suburbs.” 121   Information on the Raid and Hammond’s arrest burst on to the 
American scene as quickly as news could travel. 
 “No Wonder There’s Trouble,” The Minneapolis Journal trumpeted on December 
30th, 1895: “colonial Englishmen now realize why Washington and his pals refused to 
pay taxes to England.”122  Yet despite the attempts of some to frame Hammond’s actions 
and those of his accomplices as indicative of strong Washingtonian values, the 
preponderance of American newspapers responded negatively to news of Britain’s 
blunder in the South African Republic.  Reporting that “the Americans and Germans are 
siding with the Transvaal government in the controversy over ceding rights to 
foreigners,” on the same day, The Wheeling Register—another heartland paper—took the 
opposite tack.123  “Sweet Revenge!” cried The Knoxville Journal, lauding the Transvaal’s 
victory, while the Daily Inter-Ocean of Chicago took space to print the words of a Mr. 
Van Luven of Oakland, California, who claimed to have lived in the Transvaal; a 
defender of Republikeinse policies with a decidedly progressive slant.  In the Cape 
Colony, Mr. Van Luven explained, “they have little use for Americans.” 
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In Cape Town if an American applies for work they smilingly tell him that his 
services are not needed.   
It is different in the Transvaal.  The Dutch welcome an American and have 
little use for an Englishman.  The little republic has good reason for this hatred, as 
history shows.  The Dutch government protects and looks out for a workingman.  
In sickness the contractor is forced by the republic to care for the workman, and 
there is quick punishment meted out to any who attempts to defraud a 
workman.124 
 
Predictably, many papers sought to connect the Raid with the Anglo-Venezuelan crisis.  
The Knoxville Journal wondered whether German’s inflammatory “Kruger Telegram,” 
congratulating the Transvaal president for his conduct, suggested an African Monroe 
Doctrine was in play.125  A war between Germany and Great Britain would be in many 
ways just as frightening as a war between Great Britain and the United States. 
 C. Tsehloane Keto estimates that two thirds of American newspapers disapproved 
of the Jameson Raid, but their reasons for doing so varied quite a bit.126  Most were more 
concerned with British expansion than they were with South African Republic for its own 
sake, and appraisals of Uitlander demands were often merely parenthetical to the greater 
story regarding the far reaching geopolitical implications of the Raid.  Hammond was 
extremely well-connected in Republican circles, but even after news broke of his arrest 
public opinion remained broadly hostile to Britain.127 At the time the arrest was first 
reported, seventy-one per cent of Republican newspapers, forty-four per cent of 
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Democratic papers, and twenty per cent of independent papers (probably Mugwump 
dominated) disapproved of the Transvaal’s action.  Yet in the intervening months, as 
Hammond’s health failed and the Transvaal court handed him a death sentence, pro-
British sentiment increased, and—on the testimony of people who claimed to know 
southern Africa like the Reverend W. Douglas Mackenzie and the Reverend Francis W. 
Bates—public opinion began to move in a less Anglophobic direction.128  Over the voices 
of those who blamed the Americans for the Raid’s failure and raged against British 
perfidy, for others it was clear Hammond had led “an entirely peaceful” revolution, “the 
only motive for it…[being]… the protection of lives and property of the people of that 
city.”129  A charm offensive by British diplomatic authorities eager to rebuild American 
trust coming out of the Venezuela crisis also contributed significantly to a pro-British 
revival.  Indeed, they were quite necessary: Hammond was a prominent American 
sentenced, perhaps unfairly, to death, and the United States would not have a consul in 
Pretoria up and running until 1898.130 
 So much for the broad contours of public opinion.  Through a more nuanced lens, 
however, it is clear that American opinion on the Jameson Raid was both unstable and 
divided. Americans were interested in the crisis, and certainly the Hammond trial, but 
approached it with a woefully incomplete picture of what southern Africa was actually 
like, and, most importantly, who the Republikeinse were.  The British were a familiar 
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quantity, if not always so predictable; the black and mixed-race inhabitants of the country 
did not figure prominently in the debate.  But the “Boers” seemed full of contradictions.  
White—yet living in Africa, wild—yet austere, savage and yet Christian, strong and yet 
degenerate, nimble and yet lazy; these are but a few of the paradoxes that in intervening 
years would feature prominently in newspaper editorials, pamphlets, private letters and 
everyday conversations.  In Theodore Roosevelt’s oft-quoted phrase, the Republikeinse 
were “belated Cromwellians” adrift in the unfamiliar nineteenth century, and yet in the 
opinion of the Broad Axe, a black newspaper from St. Paul, Minnesota, they were true 
socialists, a cause célèbre: 
The Transvaal is the nearest approach to a socialist commonwealth that the world, 
so far as history can tell, has ever seen.  There is no such thing as poverty in the 
Transvaal; or,  to be correct, there was no such thing before the Uitlanders came 
pouring in after gold and the wealth that lay in the mines…They want to see 
“teeming hives of industry” in the land; in a word the greedy ruffians who entered 
the Transvaal like lions and tried to leave it like hares essayed to establish the 
rotten system of civilization that prevails in London, Paris, and New York, in 
South Africa.131 
 
 With firsthand knowledge about their customs, sympathies and natures 
concentrated in the hands of a very few, the Republikeinse burgher in the United States 
was constructed as an almost mythic other, with attributes as perplexing as they were 
mutable, onto whose unknown visage one could project any number of debates and 
historical metaphors.  In the candid words of The Friend, a Quaker journal, the Transvaal 
Boers were “the nearest modern approach to the old Hebrew patriarchs[;]…the average 
Boer is according to his lights, a citizen pioneer, and a rough, God-fearing, honest, 
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homely, uneducated philistine.”132  Indeed, paradoxically, it would be as both Israelite 
and Philistine that the burghers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State would live out the 
next several years in the American mind. 
—— 
 The Boer-as-construct was born in America at a time when racial ideas were in a 
unique state of flux.  As C. Vann Woodward argued over half a century ago, it is no 
accident that America’s acceptance of “the white man’s burden” coincided with a 
revolution in race relations—as southern black Americans were legally disfranchised, 
subordinated, and segregated within society by a rapid volley of new laws and 
reactionary court decisions in the 1890’s.133  Indeed, “if the stronger and cleverer race is 
free to impose its will upon ‘new-caught, sullen peoples’ on the other side of the globe,” 
The Atlantic Monthly asked in 1901, “why not in South Carolina or Mississippi?”134  And 
why stop with African-Americans?  According the U.S. census, in 1890 over 9.2 million 
people in America were reported to be foreign born; at 14.7 per cent of the population, 
this was the highest figure since at least 1790.  By 1900 the percentage had fallen 
slightly—to 13.6 per cent—but with so many of the new immigrants coming from 
unfamiliar and impoverished countries in eastern and southern Europe, “Anglo-Saxon” 
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pundits saw a cause for deep concern, particularly those living in the crowded cities of 
the east coast.135  
 The whiteness scholar Matthew Frye Jacobson places the turn of the twentieth 
century within a paradigm of American racial thought that he refers to as “variegated 
whiteness,” marked native-born Euro-Americans’ struggle to categorize immigrant 
groups in a way that asserted native privilege while maintaining a degree of intellectual 
coherence. 136   This “regime of racial understanding” that entailed an “increasing 
fragmentation and hierarchical ordering of distinct white races (now in the plural)” was 
not the obscure province of racial pseudo-scientists.  It found wide currency in the 
discourse of the era and as such is reflected in the debates of the time over the true nature 
of the crises in southern Africa.137  The Republikeinse may not have been immigrants at 
America’s gates (though after the war several pro-Republikeinse advocates sought to 
grant them American land), but the air of novelty and mystery surrounding them invited 
racialization.  While only a few writers openly questioned the whiteness of Republikeinse 
burghers, the frequency their physical and mental features were described in chiefly 
racial terms, alongside comparisons to various “uncivilized,” “barbaric” groups is a 
significant part of the South African War in the U.S.  Though not as dangerous to the 
American body politic as Italians and Slavs, they were, many suggested, just as 
unpleasant, primitive, and probably irredeemable.   
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 Others felt quite strongly otherwise.  “The Boers are not niggers,” the veteran 
John Y. Fillmore Blake bluntly put it, “notwithstanding the fact that the whole British 
press labored hard during the year preceding the war to make the world believe they were 
niggers, and savage ones, too.”138  On the other side of the rhetorical trenches, pro-
Republikeinse activists responded to pro-British writers by striking strong contrasts and 
painting the Republikeinse as what Julia Spicher Kasdorf has called “ultra-white.”  
Having coined the term to describe portrayals of the Amish in American popular culture, 
Kasdorf’s insight is rooted in the idea that while whiteness positions itself favorably on a 
continuum with “non-whiteness” or “blackness,” it cannot occupy the positive extreme of 
that continuum, since to do so would threaten the air of normativity to critical to its 
power.  Blackness and whiteness, then, are not exactly polar opposites.  Ultra-whiteness 
is unevenly but naturally and necessarily imagined as the white fantasy that directly 
opposes the nightmare of blackness; in Spicher’s words “both nonwhite and ultra-white 
aspects must be projected outside to maintain the illusion of neutrality and rationality 
associated with the normalized ‘we’ that is whiteness.”139  Like the Amish of the 1950’s, 
the Republikeinse seemed to many to represent a utopian American past, one that was 
gone in the modern United States, but that still existed, under great threat, in Africa.  One 
might say that for pro-British writers the Republikeinse were like so many unintelligent, 
uncouth Italians; yet for pro-Republikeinse groups the burghers of Pretoria really were 
the last of the Romans. 
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 Furthermore, since the proper treatment of new immigrants was a major point of 
Anglo-Republikeinse conflict, the nativist movement towards “restrictionism” involved 
itself in the debate.  American pro-Republikeinse activists criticized advocates for 
Uitlander rights for their hypocrisy regarding Chinese exclusion, while many pro-
Republikeinse advocates, like the pamphleteer Sydney George Fisher, vocally supported 
ending large-scale immigration.140  Surely it was one of the basic rights of independent 
nations to regulate immigration.  But were the southern African republics independent?  
More to the point, should they be?  Curious Americans turned to books, pamphlets and 
periodicals for answers to these questions.   
——  
 Born on March 18th, 1871 in the south-central Virginian county of Prince Edward, 
Ella Graham Agnew always had an adventurous spirit.  Coming of age in the decades 
following the Civil War, Agnew grew up amid “a generation of women without men,” to 
quote Anne Firor Scott.141  After developing her stenographic skills, in her early twenties 
Agnew took secretarial jobs that steadily widened her horizons: first in the small 
southwestern Virginia town of Abingdon, and then at a publishing house in Northport, on 
Long Island.142  It was at Northport in 1894 that she happened upon Virginia Pride, the 
principal of the Huguenot Seminary in Wellington, Cape Colony—a women’s high 
school supported through American missionary funding and “a show place for American 
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and British visitors.”143  Departing alone for the Cape Colony in 1895 to begin work at 
the school, her letters to her sisters are a treasure trove of insight into southern African 
life through the eyes of an unmarried young white woman from America.  “In Cape 
Town,” she reported in September 1895, “they are building a very pretty P.O. [post 
office] on the American plan and the people that very, very high.  Some of the houses 
even have thatched roofs.”144  Coming from rural Virginia, Agnew was amused to be 
suddenly considered a model of cosmopolitan urbanity, but it was an identity that she 
nevertheless embraced, at one point even dressing as Martha Washington for a 
Whitmonday costume party.  “Whenever there is to be an entertainment,” she commented 
demurely, 
I am in demand to arrange the hair of more than a dozen people.  I must also 
select dresses for all the girls [of the school] and the way in which they are to be 
made.  This is  expected of me and you know just how much taste I have and you 
also know that I can hardly manage my own hair, not to mention anyone else’s 
[emphasis hers].145 
 
 But Agnew’s comments on southern African society were not always so 
lighthearted or amusing.  The latter half of her five years abroad was spent as a 
stenography teacher at Amajuba Seminarium in the small Transvaal town of 
Wakkerstroom, where she got her first introduction to Republikeinse culture.  She 
undoubtedly liked and respected the Transvaalers she met, but objected passionately to 
the austere patriarchal norms of burgher society.  Answering the common British 
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accusation that the Dutch race was incurably lethargic, she detailed her frustration in an 
1897 letter: 
I wonder if America would have been so slow developing if it had such a large 
Dutch element.  I don’t believe it would, of course, we are more accessible than 
So. Africa, which would make a great deal of difference. So many things here are 
against all my  former ideas.  In the Dutch Ref[ormed] Church, for instance, on 
communion Sunday all the women must dress in black and they may not go to the 
table until the men have finished and in everything men must come first.  In a 
way, they are very good to their women folk but as for me, I don’t care for their 
way for they have [a] superior air when discussing a thing with a woman  and 
they do not hesitate to say that man is by far  woman’s superior in every way.146 
 
And again, in August 1899, on the very eve of war: 
  
I fear I will horrify the good people here if I go out with a hoe, they think we poor 
women may do as we please inside the house, but outside, where people can see 
us, we  must not attempt any man’s real labor.147 
 
 Ella Graham Agnew, as an unmarried American woman in southern Africa, was a 
definite rarity.  For that reason her insights are all the more valuable.  A committed 
Transvaal sympathizer in the conflict with Britain, in 1899 when the war finally broke 
out and her school closed she records dutifully seeing off Republikeinse commandoes to 
war and tending to prisoners (at one point even meeting Winston Churchill) before 
becoming an “Interpreter of the Language and Feelings of the Nations” for the American 
Consulate in Pretoria.148  She finally returned to the United States in mid-1900, where she 
would start a long and successful career in civic affairs until her death in 1958.  But for 
all she admired about southern Africa, it was the stifling conservatism of the Dutch-
speaking whites that stuck with her for life.  Though she sided with them over the British, 
it was in “watching a small group of intelligent, devoted women bring about the repeal of 
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certain…vicious laws[,]…she had a glimpse of what value women could be if they were 
acknowledged citizens.” 149   Though her personal circumstances were unique, her 
simultaneous attraction to Dutch-speaking southern African life and repulsion from some 
of its norms was a dilemma that many other Americans would process in less satisfying 
ways. 
 —— 
 Just as not all American visitors to southern Africa were men, not all were white 
either, a truth regrettably unacknowledged in Louis Changuion’s otherwise excellent 
account of American opinion in the late 1890’s.  In fact, few Americans knew southern 
Africa better, or were more interested in it, then the clergy and involved laity of the 
African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church and certain African American Baptist 
groups, whose missionary interest in the black population of southern Africa was 
burgeoning at the time. Concurrently, Orpheus McAdoo’s collegiate singing group, the 
Virginia Jubilee Singers (later renamed the High Class Colored American Minstrel 
Company), spent in total about five years performing to standing room-only crowds in 
southern Africa between 1890 and 1898, closely followed by the African-American 
newspapers in the United States with whom McAdoo corresponded and who often 
reproduced articles from the Cape Colony’s nascent black press.150  
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 When his troupe came to Pretoria in 1891 “every item was encored and the 
greatest enthusiasm prevailed.”151  McAdoo was lauded for “drawing his honor, President 
Kruger, out of his shell”—the strict Calvinist claimed never to have entered a theatre 
before—and, according to the Cleveland Gazette, “tears could be seen streaming down 
the rugged features of the President” when the singers struck up “Nobody Knows the 
Trouble I Have Seen.”152  “I have met with financial success far and away beyond my 
wildest dreams and anticipations,” McAdoo told The Star, a Johannesburg paper, shortly 
afterwards, for “in all my travels I have met with the most flattering receptions, and the 
press, generally, have been unanimous in their kind expressions of praise.”153  Though 
ultimately a friend of the British cause, McAdoo’s excellent sense of his audiences 
endeared him even to the hardest-shelled of Transvaal burghers, and despite the fact that 
he and his troupe were arrested and harassed from time to time, his reception by Kruger 
and legal acceptance as an American citizen first and foremost, regardless of color, 
perhaps did something to endear American blacks to the white Transvaalers, who despite 
their explicit rejection of black equality were at least opposed to inhumane British mining 
practices.  In the words of one black newspaper, “although no parliaments have been 
interpellated about the matter and no raid is organized to assist them…at most of the 
mines the negroes are treated simply as beasts.”154  Though the Republikeinse had hard 
shells, perhaps they were as utterly impregnable as feared. 
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 Yet the honor of being, by Kruger’s own reckoning, “the first black man whose 
hand I have ever shaken,” was not McAdoo’s.  Instead, it was that of the fiery and 
controversial Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the A.M.E. Church, who visited South 
Africa in 1898 to ordain 65 black ministers.155  A staunch advocate of black American 
emigration “back-to-Africa,” Turner took the words of Psalm 68 (“princes shall come out 
of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God”) quite literally, and many 
black American Christians agreed.  As the racial nadir of the post-Reconstruction era was 
circumscribing opportunities for black advancement in the United States, black African 
Christians educated in southern African mission schools found themselves beginning to 
chafe under their white leadership.156   
 Ironically, the very success of Christian mission work in certain sectors of black 
African society became a dilemma for white missionaries as the nineteenth century wore 
on and the ideas of scientific racism took deeper root.  According to James T. Campbell, 
“As late as 1875 an ordained African minister represented the pinnacle of missionary 
achievement, a flesh-and-blood vindication of evangelical enterprise and of Africans’ 
innate potential.  A quarter century later, the same figure was a changeling, whose very 
existence menaced social order”157 As Campbell and J. Mutero Chirenje both have traced 
in their excellent studies, this led in the final decades of the century to a series of schisms 
within the African missions, as black pastors set out to create their own (for whites, 
                                                 
155
 Noer, Briton, Boer and Yankee, 59. 
156
 Psalm 68:31, Authorized (King James) version. 
157
 James T. Campbell, Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and 
Southern Africa (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1995): 113. 




potentially subversive) “Ethiopian” churches. 158   In 1892 Mangena Mokone’s 
congregation at Marabastad, near Pretoria, broke away from the Wesleyan Methodist 
Missionary Society in one of the highest profile splits, outlining its problems with the 
Society in a gripping manifesto.  Having likely learned of the A.M.E. church through, 
among other things, contact with American seamen (one third of whom were black), in 
1896 they sent one of their number, James Dwane, to the United States to recruit black 
missionaries.  Though the development of the A.M.E. Church in southern Africa was 
conducted largely without direct American help, the influence of figures like Bishop 
Turner and the institutional strength of the denomination in the United States had a 
powerful effect on southern African Christians.  Even under the burden of wartime travel 
restrictions (a cumbersome addition to the normal difficulties of traveling while black in 
southern Africa), preachers combed the land and gathered 40,000 members for the flock.  
It was only after 1902 when the victorious British acted to quell what they feared were 
the seeds of a rebellious “Africa for the Africans” movement—Kruger, for his part, 
preferred to remain aloof and probably saw the movement as a useful short-term 
counterweight to the missionary societies he despised.159 
 It is perhaps owing to this missionary effort that there is a decided paucity of data 
on the true nature of domestic African American opinion truly was during the South 
African War.  In the field, however, the issue of the so-called “white man’s war” could 
not be ignored.  A.M.E. (and later Baptist) clergy and missionaries active in the region 
had no illusions regarding Republikeinse opinion of native black people, and most of 
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them hoped that with a British victory over the Republics would facilitate the enactment 
of more liberal policies towards economic and political participation such as those 
already in force at the Cape (hopes that again, ultimately, would come to very little).  
What many of them did not foresee was that African Ethiopianists were not interested in 
simply exchanging their white leaders for African American ones, many of whom 
combined the same prejudices with an even more rudimentary understanding of African 
society.  In the words of a 1903 letter of protest signed by several prominent black 
ministers, a plan to bring African-American “supervisors” to southern Africa, 
places us under the same conditions that forced us to leave the white churches, to 
be placed under the superintendency of men who are ignorant of the people, their 
customs, traditions, and life in general; these men will have to require interpreters 
wherever they  go, and they do not always seem to have sympathy with the people, 
having been disappointed with the state in which they found them.160 
 
Hopes for a cooperative black future would not die with the postwar fragmentation of the 
Ethiopianist churches, but, as Robert T. Vinson argues in his study of South African 
Garveyism, “African Americans and Africans had profound cultural, linguistic, 
educational, and other differences that often led to misunderstandings, misplaced 
expectations, and mutual disappointment.”161   Black American opinion regarding the 
events of a war that so 69rahmin69ni white Americans still constitutes a significant 
lacuna in the study of the period, all the more so because their interest and actions in 
southern Africa are absolutely essential to the story.  More will be said about this 
dilemma in the next chapter.  
——  
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 Following the Jameson Raid, the need for better information about southern 
African events became apparent to the American press, which dispatched correspondents 
to report back to a confused nation the nature of the realities on the ground in the region.  
Poultney Bigelow was one such writer.  In the summer of 1896—with John Hays 
Hammond’s fate stillquite unresolved—Bigelow conducted a comprehensive tour of the 
area for Harper’s New Monthly magazine, a body of work published soon afterwards as a 
book under the name White Man’s Africa.  As a narrative it exemplifies the model that a 
number of later writers would follow in compiling books about the southern African 
situation. 
 The book makes no bones about its sympathies from the outset, opening with an 
elaborate dedication to Marthinus Steyn, the president of the Orange Free State 
(commonly viewed as more cosmopolitan than the Transvaal).  Bigelow also forcefully 
advocates a South African union, for “as in my country the citizens of Virginia and New 
York call themselves Americans, so in South Africa the Transvaal Dutchman and the 
Cape Englishman must in future think less of what each is giving up and more of what all 
are gaining in common by a United Fatherland.”162  In fact, Bigelow was an ardent 
nationalist and a Germanophile, whose previous notable published work, History of the 
German Struggle for Liberty, waxed rhapsodic upon the consolidation of the German 
empire (he was also a personal friend of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and responded favorably, at 
least early on, to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany).163  Bigelow, exemplifying a 
common trend among American writers, continually voices his desire to see southern 
Africa remade along American lines, and for the (white) people of South Africa to 
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discover a new identity as “Afrikanders.”  Moreover, frequent references to American 
history, life and principles of government help to render southern Africa intelligible to 
uneducated readers.  For Bigelow, the Jameson Raid was a mistake and an impediment to 
southern Africa’s progress, but so were the laws against which the Uitlanders justly 
rebelled, for “the Transvaal has grown rich by the earnings of an alien population to 
which she has made no adequate return.”164 
 Assessing America’s ability to represent its interests overseas, Bigelow had little 
positive to say about the state of the American foreign service.  “In the memory of the 
oldest inhabitant of Cape Town,” Bigelow writes, “such a thing as an American consul 
who could keep sober after twelve o’clock noon was too seldom known”—“Uncle Sam 
offers such a man the wages of a second-rate mechanic or baseball-player.”165  But he did 
have a great deal to say that was of American interest—-comparative interest.  Almost 
everything southern African had an American equivalent.  Voortrekkers, in his view, 
were analogues of “the American cowboy of New Mexico or Wyoming,” while “the 
coolie of Natal” corresponded to “the Chinaman…of our Pacific coast,” and the 
respective black populations languished mutually, the two living equally deficient in 
virtue.166   Never a fan of the Transvaal burghers, with an independent but civilized 
administration along the lines already established in the Orange Free State under 
President Steyn, Bigelow hoped all members of a new “United States of South Africa,” 
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could flourish, confident of their autonomy and national destiny.167  Americanness was 
the clear answer to South Africa’s woes. 
 Like so many other American writers, for Bigelow the mythical racial essence of 
the Transvaal burgher was most clearly to be found in the forbidding personality of 
President Paul Kruger, a man whose eyes Bigelow describes as “close together and small, 
resembling those of a North American Indian,” in stark contrast to the “frank as well as 
fearless” visage of President Steyn.168  While Bigelow praises the burghers for certain 
elements of their lifestyle—particularly their Christian attitudes towards their foes in the 
wake of the 1881 battle of Majuba Hill—and revels in retelling apocryphal tales of 
Kruger’s life (he famously self-amputated his own infected thumb in order to continue 
using a rifle), “Oom Paul” and his world ultimately were outmoded relics on the cusp of 
the new century, long since superseded by a greater phase of southern African 
civilization, a situation with clear American antecedents, for just as 
The blacks held that [the land] was theirs because from time out of mind blacks 
had peopled all th[e] neighborhood…the Boers argued, on the other side, that the 
blacks were, after all, merely heathen, and did not make good use of their 
property. The white man argued in South Africa much as he did in New England 
when he landed on Plymouth  Rock, and cheerfully expelled the heathen who set 
up prescriptive claims to Massachusetts. Such arguments as these were of great 
assistance to the pioneers who crossed the Mississippi, scaled the Rocky 
Mountains, and astonished the Spanish Americans who then claimed California, 
New Mexico, and a great deal more. In fact, it is in human nature that even God-
fearing and law-abiding men accept readily the doctrine that the earth belongs to 
those who make best use of it. Indeed, the philosophy which cheered the Boers 
who weeded out the blacks fifty years ago differs not much from the philosophy 
of the Anglo-Saxons now occupying the gold-fields of the Transvaal.169 
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 In this way Poultney Bigelow was able to render a complex situation and hitherto 
barely understood situation in South Africa comprehensible to the American public, 
along with all the prestige according to that accomplishment.  Whatever subsequent 
American writers believed about southern Africa, their analyses usually conformed to the 
same schema, with Kruger himself, the Boer generally, and the “native question” 
comprising the major concerns.  As attested by the notes in his journals, Bigelow’s field 
work was carried out in an environment of near-constant comparison, as the minutest 
details of southern African life were juxtaposed with diverse aspects of the United States.  
Bigelow’s jotted notes for Johannesburg, for example, read thus (note the marked 
contrast to Hammond’s genteel description of the city):  
a moral Monte Carlo—Virginia City in Africa—no moral standards—costliest 
silks & velvets trailing in the dirty streets—big dusty.  Windswept road—no 
water, no sprinkling—mass of Jews talking German English…Rand Club lobby 
like a Jew stock Exchange—house saturated with whisky & German.   
Medley of Virginia City—San Antonio—Bowery—great market square 
—loads of dust—rough people—gaudy women—blacks &c.170 
 
 As the storm clouds of all-out war gathered in the tense period between 1896 and 
the late (northern hemisphere) summer of 1899, the fragmented understandings 
Americans had already constructed in a bid to make sense of the southern African 
situation became deeper and more complex and, as one can already discern in White 
Man’s Africa, they began to be rearrange into broader historical comparisons that said at 
least as much about the United States as about the Transvaal.  Having established  ways 
to answer the question “Who are the Boers?” (albeit only sketchily), Americans had 
cause to cultivate and deepen their understanding of the conflict, and in many cases, were 
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spurred to extraordinary action.  Against the backdrop of an unashamedly pro-British 
Republican administration, a scattered corps of male and female activists sought to use 
new comparative rhetoric to guide and galvanize American opinion further in favor of the 
Republikeinse cause, chiefly by engendering a sense of republican brotherhood.  Though 
ultimately unsuccessful in bringing about meaningful change, their struggle to calm the 
seas of historical metaphor and partisan politics while at the same time recounting 
imperfect information about the war produced by an elite and incestuous clique of 
travelers and analysts is a crucial aspect of the story this paper intends to lay out, and it is 

































Chapter III:  Vicksburg, Valley Forge, and Vaal Krantz 
Historical Metaphor and American Opinion on the South African War, 1899-1902 
 
“As long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction that the one 
indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with 
England.  But an alliance must remain, in the present state of things, an unattainable 
dream. 
 Have you seen Bourke Cockran’s foul letter to the President demanding that we 
shall side with the Boers against England?  I declined to answer it, except by 
acknowledging receipt, and then he printed it.  All the Irish, and many Germans, take the 
same attitude.  But of course we shall do nothing of the kind.  I hope, if it comes to 
blows, that England will make short work of Uncle Paul.  Sooner or later, her influence 
must be dominant there, and the sooner the better” 
 —Secretary of State John Hay to Henry White, September 24th, 1899.171 
 
“Have our friends lost their heads completely?  Has everybody over there been carried 
away with this sickly sentimentality over our new-found friendship with Great Britain?  
What is the meaning of it all?  It is bad enough to have a lot of amiable ladies, in hopes or 
possession of English husbands, or those ambitious statesmen whose eyes are set on the 
Court of St. James siding against the Boers, but to find sensible people, whose forefathers 
fought at Lexington, hurling their hats in the air because this big Empire, taking leave of 
its conscience, has set about to wipe a couple of little Republics from the face of the earth 
is enough to make George Washington’s ghost turn handsprings around the green, 
flowery slopes of Mt. Vernon.” 
 —John Elmer Milholland to John Hay, November 22nd, 1899.172 
 
 The Jameson conspiracy and subsequent fiasco may have been clear victories for 
Paul Kruger and the Transvaal burghers in the short term, but it was clear to all observers 
by the end of 1896 that matters in southern Africa were going to get worse before getting 
better.  Immediately after the raid, the German government reportedly offered to send 
marines to Pretoria, and dispatched a warship to the Portuguese port of Delagoa Bay, 
close to the Transvaal border, in the hope of expanding its influence in southern Africa 
and checking the British in their ongoing Cape to Cairo territorial push.173  Rhodes was 
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soon forced to resign his post as premier of the Cape Colony, and Jameson was arrested 
and imprisoned by British authorities for several months for a breach of the Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1870.174  Tempers continued to flare between the Transvaal and the 
British Government as American writers continued trying to make sense of the situation.  
Expert opinion was elastic.  Contrasting his account against the “many popular 
misconceptions concerning [the Boers],” “discolored with London additions,” Howard 
Hillegas’s 1899 Oom Paul’s People is an early example of pro-Republikeinse American 
writing, yet even Hillegas is somewhat circumspect in his estimation of Uitlander woes, 
conceding in the preface that “the alleged grievances of the Uitlanders are so complex 
and multitudinous that a mere enumeration of them would necessitate a second 
volume.”175  The prominent American writer and journalist Richard Harding Davis, who 
was soon to become one of the most important American authorities on the southern 
African situation, candidly describes changing his mind about John Hays Hammond’s 
culpability in the Jameson Raid after hearing his side of the story in his first ever article 
about the region.176 
 As has been seen in the above chapter, the earliest prewar American writing on 
the southern African situation established tropes that would remain dominant as the 
conflict raged on, hoisting aloft the mythic persona of Paul Kruger as the fundamental 
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Boer, and offering up increasingly elaborate American points of comparison.  Crucially 
important was the debate surrounding the ‘true” nature of the Republikeinse Americans 
knew so little of—were they barbarous relics, barely even white, or ultra-white racial 
exemplars?  Americans were not nearly so interested in what the war meant for Britain as 
in what it meant about the burgher Republics and about American identity.  Justice, 
citizenship, race, immigration, the merits of capitalism, and the merits of civilization 
would all be debated in heated, extravagant and comparison-rich Victorian language by 
Americans who felt passionate solidarity with both sides.  And yet, for all its efforts, the 
American pro-Republikeinse movement was ultimately unable either to shift the 
Republican administration’s pro-British policies or to rouse large numbers of Americans 
to popular revolt against what they saw as a fundamental betrayal of all America claimed 
to stand for.  The progress of all their efforts is the focus of the following discussion. 
—— 
 On June 15th, 1899, the staff of a Philadelphia newspaper, The North American, 
minced no words towards Uncle Paul in an editorial entitled “The Lesson of the Boer”: 
The Boer must go.  English power has driven him from pillar to post, 
appropriating what was his when he fled; and now that he has been again 
overtaken in the wilderness, which he sought as a safe refuge, he must yield once 
more or die. 
  It is hard on the Boer, but in the end it will be good for mankind.177 
 
The North American’s article is remarkable, not only for the strength of its convictions, 
but also for the avowedly vitalist position it takes on the affairs of nations.  There is no 
expression at all of republican fellow feeling with the burghers of the Transvaal; in the 
editors’ view, their true state is well beyond the pale of worthy civilization.  Indeed, by 
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their own admission, in order to take a pro-British view of the situation, the 
Republikeinse way must be barbaric.  In true Spencerian fashion, the piece continues, 
Naturally, the African Dutchman does not see things in this light.  Indeed, his 
case, as he presents it in the court of morals, is unassailable, except upon the 
evolutionary principle.  Evolution takes small account of the moral rights of its 
victims.  The doctrine of survival of the fittest, which in large human affairs is the 
doctrine of the better use, dooms the Boer to extirpation, with the alternative, 
scarcely more kind, of harmonizing himself with his new environment.178 
 
But these hard truths are not all readers of The North American had to chew on.  The 
coming war in Africa held much more direct lessons for Americans than that.  “The 
Boer’s fate,” according to the editors,  
is an anticipation of what we shall see on this continent.  When the population of 
the United States has grown to 200,000,000, or perhaps before that, our neighbors 
to the  South and North, unless meanwhile they shall have become much more 
like ourselves than they are at present in their industries and ideals, will surely 
undergo what the Boer is about to experience.  We shall swarm upon their lands, 
first as humble and ingratiating Outlanders, then as injured and protesting 
capitalists and free men denied a voice in the laws which govern person and 
property. 
… 
There is no escape for the Boer.  He is the farm up to which the city has grown, 
and his fields are needed for town lots.  The injustice done him—and there is no 
blinking in the injustice—is part of the price which is paid for national expansion.  
Through his removal  or absorption into the new mass, a hundred human beings 
will be given a livelihood where one now exists; for a Boer, like an Indian, 
requires much land in order that he may live in the archaic fashion which he 
loves. 
Mexico and Canada—and especially Mexico—will grieve for the 
disappearing Boer with a sorrow that cannot be free from apprehension.179 
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 Not only does “The Lesson of the Boer” put forward a vitalist vision of future 
American expansion, it casts both the Uitlanders and the Republikeinse as familiar 
caricatures from America’s past, present and future.  While the history of past American 
expansion south and west is only implicitly referenced in the editorial, it necessarily 
influences the comparison of the Republikeinse with Indians and Mexicans, two groups 
whose “removal or absorption” was seen as necessary to the progress of the United 
States.  There is no use in cheering for the underdog, according to The North American, 
weakness is no virtue.  As the article explains, “strength is never at a loss for excellent 
reasons for exerting and enriching itself.”180  Echoing the words of a a New York Times 
editorial from the previous month, there was no use in fretting over the moral dimension 
of the unequal Anglo-Republikeinse struggle, for after all 
It is not the machinations of Cecil Rhodes or any other individual with which the 
Boers  are contending…It is the ‘Zeitgeist,’ the ‘spirit of the age’…There is no 
room in the world for ‘peculiar people’ who insist on non-conformity, and upon 
taking up more room than belongs to them or then they can use to the utmost 
advantage…They must conform, like the Mormon, or be extinguished like the 
North American Indian181 
 
 Native Americans were a popular referent for pro-British pundits.  Writing for 
The Arena in May 1900, the Danish-American Johannes Hrolf Wisby engaged in an 
extended comparison of Boers to native Americans, critiquing the appeals for justice 
common in pro-Republikeinse rhetoric, appeals he regarded as naïve.  America’s Indian 
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wars, according to Wisby, were “criticized abroad in very much the same stupid 
manner…We were branded as the rude and selfish exterminators of a brave aboriginal 
race.  We were the money-mad sharks of a superior race who swooped upon the poor 
Indian”; yet history attests to a quite different version of events.  “The governing policy 
of the United States” in Wisby’s estimation, “was and still is based on equity, liberality, 
and magnanimity.” 182   In southern Africa, “the prototype of these conditions exists 
approximately,” because “the British, too, have found they can do nothing with the 
Boer.”  “He is not a savage,” Wisby admitted, “but he is as hostile to civilization as the 
red man.”183   Again one sees the Republikeinse burgher racialized in a striking and 
precise way.  While apparently retaining his whiteness, the “Boer” is attacked branded 
primitive, aboriginal, and savage.  He is an embarrassing paradox, a contemptible relic 
with whom the British must swiftly deal.  In a unique riff on the rhetoric surrounding 
what James Barrett and David Roediger call “inbetween peoples”—the impoverished 
“new” immigrants entering the United States from southern and eastern Europe at the 
time—Wisby suggests that it was the migration of superior Uitlanders that exposed the 
degraded racial status of the Boer, for “only when brought into contact with people not of 
his faith and blood does the Boer show the grim, repulsive qualities of his nature.”184  
Ironically for a writer so wholeheartedly committed himself to the imperialist master 
narrative of “civilization,” Wisby identifies the burgher’s chief problem as stubbornness, 
his insistence on conformity to his own norms.  “Be like him in everything that appertains 
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to life—and you will notice his native charms and homely graces,” Wisby suggests, “but 
dare not be otherwise!”185 
 Other pro-British writers avoided such strident and racially-charged expressions 
of disdain for the Republikeinse cause.  If pro-British writers could show that the so-
called Boer republics were, in fact, not republics at all, but “narrow oligarch[ies],” 
traditional American support for republics need not be tossed aside so cavalierly; the 
ensuing debate could be civic rather than racial.186  As The Outlook explained in an 
editorial of October 1899, “the war in South Africa is an unnecessary war,” yet  
It is a war between progress and inertia, republicanism and oligarchy, civilization 
and—not barbarism, but intellectual sloth. 
Let us not be confused because the Transvaal is called a Republic and  
Great Britain is called an Empire.187 
 
After enumerating the South African Republic’s many legal and governmental sins, the 
article quotes a former U.S. Consul to Cairo predicting British victory and a positive 
“deluge of business in South Africa” after the war’s inevitable conclusion.  Ultimately, 
according to the article, the demands of constitutionalism and the moral law of capitalism 
converge as one, for 
What rights do priority of occupancy give a people?  Have they a moral right to 
retain a territory undeveloped against the rest of the world, because they have got 
there first?  Have half a million of North American Indians a right to a continent 
that can support a hundred million?  Have a community of Boers a right to a 
country rich in mines which they either will not or cannot develop?  Has the dog a 
right to keep the ox out of the manger? 
We think not.  And while we believe that a true statesman in Mr. 
Chamberlain’s place [Joseph Chamberlain was the British Colonial Secretary at 
the time] would have won without war all that he will win by war…we believe 
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that neither justice, liberty, nor civilization would be favored by the victory of the 
Boers, and all three will be at the last the gainers in the victory of the British.188 
 
 While a preponderance of the American public likely professed pro-
Republikeinse sympathies, it is important to recall that there were others in America, 
unaffiliated with the government, whose support for the British cause was quite sincere.  
Of this pro-British lobby, no figure was more important to the war and the course of 
American diplomacy than the U.S. Secretary of State, John Milton Hay.   
 Born in 1838 in Salem, Indiana, Hay became Secretary of State in late September 
1898, a few months after the Spanish-American War, having already made a worthy 
name for himself in American politics.  As a young man, he had been Abraham Lincoln’s 
private secretary, and was present in the room when the Surgeon General pronounced the 
President dead in April 1865.  From 1879 to 1881 he was Assistant Secretary of State 
under Rutherford Hayes, and immediately before his appointment to head the State 
Department, he served as American Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s—a posting 
that, though brief, brought his pro-British sympathies into full focus.  A firm believer in 
and booster for Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, in April 1898 Ambassador Hay expressed his 
true convictions when he remarked to an English audience that “all the nations of the 
world will profit more or less directly by every extension of British commerce and the 
enterprise and enlightenment that go with it.”189  His Anglophilic posture during the 
South African War surprised few, for, in the words of Tyler Dennett, he “was not what 
might be called an ‘under-dog’ man.” 190   His conspicuous love for Great Britain 




 John Hay, “A Partnership in Beneficence,” speech given April 21st, 1898, quoted in Kenton J. Clymer, 
John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1975): 121. 
190
 Dennett, John Hay, 240 




ultimately served him well.   Amid the excitement of the Spanish-American War he was 
able to set the stage for Anglo-American rapprochement, an effort that he maintained 
through the South African War, ultimately culminating in the November 1901 signing of 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which cleared a legal path for the construction of the Panama 
Canal.   
 After months of bitter exchanges and failed negotiation between the two sides, on 
September 29th, 1899, the British cabinet issued an ultimatum to the South African 
Republic to fully enfranchise the Uitlanders or face military intervention.  On October 
3rd, Orange Free State President Steyn’s appeal to Secretary Hay for intervention was 
rebuffed.191  On October 8th, the British Ambassador to the United States requested the 
State Department’s good offices to protect British citizens in the Transvaal in the event of 
armed conflict.192   The next day the Republikeinse governments released a counter-
ultimatum demanding Britain withdraw its troops from their borders, and by October 11th 
war had broken out at last.  In the words of a young Jan Smuts, future South African 
prime minister and international statesman, the conflict promised to be “a fight that will 
stagger humanity.”193 
 Firsthand information to help distinguish facts and allegations was always scarce.  
Brandishing what little intellectual grist they could muster by correspondence and the 
reports of Americans who had been to southern Africa, newspapers struggled to deepen 
their treatment of the southern African crisis.  Ultimately, though, it was always easier to 
talk about America than southern Africa.  Regarding Uitlander rights, the pro-
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Republikeinse activist George W. Van Siclen (a prominent Dutch American) argued that 
if the United States were being forced to accede to the demands Britain was placing on 
the Transvaal everyone would be up in arms over the prospect of “national suicide.”  The 
Republikeinse were firmly in the right, in keeping with their proud heritage and ties to the 
American past, for “these South African republicans are of the same blood with 
the…Americans of Holland or Dutch-Huguenot descent, who fought England in the 
American Revolution, and again in 1812 when England still claimed a suzerainty right to 
search American vessels.”194  Louise Vescelius-Shelton, who had written a children’s 
book called Yankee Girls in Zululand in 1888, darkly compared the struggle to the recent 
Cuban War of Independence, “where…a seemingly overwhelming army [the detested 
Spanish]…proved impotent to cope with its foe.”195 
 As 1899 wore into 1900, the staunch assurances of the pro-British press that the 
war would be short and easy were challenged in stunning fashion by a string of 
Republikeinse victories.  “There is not quite so much certainty as has been supposed,” 
conceded The North American of December 5th, 1899, with respect to how the war would 
end.  Coverage of pro-Boer meetings and remarks in Congress became more frequent as 
reports of British military blunders (often patchy and subject to censorship) trickled in 
from the other side of the world.  The new developments could be interpreted in any 
number of ways.  “Although the situation is in some respects similar to the situation in 
the Philippines,” reported the African-American Exoduster State Ledger of Topeka, 
Kansas, “the sympathy of at least a majority of Americans cannot but go out to the 
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plucky and patriotic Boers.”196  “The less the Boers need sympathy,” Hay lamented to the 
U.S. Ambassador in London, “the more they get.  If England had no reverses she might 
have done as she pleased with South Africa.”197  Following the events of the war from the 
comfort of his Richmond, Virginia home, a rank-and-file life insurance clerk named 
Theron Hart Brown provided pithy commentary in his diary throughout early 1900.  “The 
English carry the Bible in one hand & the sword in the other; but Kruger, it seemed, 
carries the Bible in his head, thus leaving both hands free for the sword,” he remarked on 
January 2nd, 1900.198  On February 8th, as the tide in southern Africa finally began to turn 
in Britain’s favor, he opined with characteristic candor that “the only safe prediction 
about the Boer war is that it will last until it is over.”199  Wise words as they were, the 
public continued to thirst for certainties that workaday reports of the war could not 
provide.  American coverage of an faraway war continued its inward turn. 
—— 
 African Americans during this period regarded the conflict with significantly 
more ambivalence than the white press—the same way they approached the whole notion 
of overseas colonialism in general.  The past few years had been terribly chaotic for the 
black community—not only were Jim Crow and lynch law on the rise, becoming 
entrenched fixtures of the Southern landscape, but blacks’ position as even second-class 
citizens of the United States was appearing shaky.  Just over a year before Transvaal 
commandoes invaded the Cape Colony, thousands of African Americans had served in 
the Spanish American War, often with great valor.  Many prominent voices (particularly 
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those opposed to the “Back to Africa” movement spearheaded at the time by Bishop 
Henry Turner) believed the participation of black troops in the field would give them an 
opportunity to demonstrate their skills and earn them the full enjoyment of American 
citizenship.  Proud of the heroism of the “buffalo soldiers” in the American West but 
frustrated by whites’ ignorance of their exploits, prominent African American pundits 
like T. Thomas Fortune advocated the formation of a black artillery unit in the East, for 
maximum visibility.200  This turned to further frustration when reports of racial tensions 
within the army came to light, such as the Tampa race riot, in which twenty-seven black 
soldiers were seriously wounded.201  Yet the white press chose to ignore the significant 
black contribution to the war effort, including the Rough Riders’ famous victory at San 
Juan Hill—where, according to one of Theodore Roosevelt’s white corporals, “if it had 
not been for the Negro cavalry, [they] would have been exterminated.”202  Yet in April 
1899 Theodore Roosevelt wrote an article for Scribner’s charging black soldiers with 
cowardice at the very same battle, charging them with being “peculiarly dependent on 
their white officers.”203  Patriotic service had failed to reap the benefits many black 
leaders had hoped for. 
 On November 10th, 1898, a few days after the election of a white mayor on a 
biracial Republican-Populist Fusion ticket, the city of Wilmington, North Carolina 
erupted in an orgy of violence that left an unclear but substantial number of black 
Americans dead.  According to H. Leon Prather, it was “the most ghastly racial massacre 
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of the Progressive era…one of the most brutal and ruthless riots in the nation’s history.”  
Not quite three years after the Jameson Raid, it was also America’s first coup d’etat, as 
white supremacist Democratic “Red Shirts” seized the city by force and precipitating an 
exodus of over two thousand blacks from Wilmington.204  For blacks like Turner who 
were feeling distinctly unwelcome at home, the prospect of American colonies in the 
tropics like Cuba and the Philippines offered potential opportunities for mass resettlement 
and the erection of a “black man’s paradise,” far from white oppression.205 
 Colonialism was a complex issue for black Americans in the 1890’s.  On the one 
hand, they could feel a solidarity with exploited peoples around the world that the white 
community could not.  They had a keen appreciation of the hardship of living on the 
wrong side of race prejudice and the global color line.  However little they knew about 
the experiences of black southern Africans, they understood that continued white 
minority rule was the only sure outcome, and this muted reactions to the conflict.  Most 
black newspapers correctly believed the British to be the more enlightened side on the 
race question, and supported them accordingly against those “whose policy has been 
repressive, exclusive, ungenerous, and tyrannical” towards black Americans, in the words 
of William Calvin Chase.206  In the very same editorial, Chase admitted that the Briton 
was almost as feckless himself, crying out for Uitlander justice while really seeking “to 
dominate the world under his hypocritical pretense of civilizing and 87rahmin87nizing 
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it.”207  At least two African Americans (H.A. Smith and Horatio L. Scott) fought for the 
British army during the war; some newspapers (like the Broad Ax of Chicago and the 
Parsons Weekly Blade, an Exoduster paper based in Kansas) took pro-Republikeinse 
editorial positions, but almost all were resigned to the basic injustice of a war for white 
supremacy fought on African soil.208  “Ah, South Africa, land of villainy, blood, and 
tears,” the enigmatic black seaman Harry Dean recalled lamenting, “I am fully convinced 
that the Boers and English have the same attitude towards the natives.”209  
——  
 With eyewitness knowledge of southern Africa so exotic and scarce and opinion 
so fluid,, the reports that did make it back to America were laden with intrigue and 
rumors of varying credibility.  Probably the highest profile American visitor to South 
Africa in 1899 was the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, an Republican politician from 
Missouri named Webster Davis, “a popular figure in Washington, a personal friend of the 
President and a well-known surrogate for McKinley in his political campaign.”  In 
addition to his other talents, Davis was “easily the finest orator in the United States” 
according to The Atchison (Kansas) Daily Globe, a political rising star.210  In December 
1899 his intention to travel to South Africa sparked widespread speculation.  Despite his 
insistence that “after a hard campaign tour…I was on the verge of nervous 
prostration…[and] it seemed to me that I was entitled to a good, long vacation,” visiting 
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“my old friend and neighbor, Colonel J.G. Stowe,” U.S. Consul General at Cape Town, 
the newspapers delighted in speculation over his real purposes.211  While press interest 
initially surrounded his troubled relationship with the Secretary of the Interior, Ethan 
Hitchcock—claiming that he planned to resign his post upon returning to the U.S. and 
inaugurate a lecture tour—by January rumors were circulating that he was being sent 
with secret instructions by the President “to keep the Administration advised as to the 
political status of the situation.”  This theory was bolstered by the testimony of Davis’s 
brother Walter, who played up the possibility of Davis’s nomination for vice president in 
the 1900 election.212  “If he should make a diplomatic stroke in South Africa,” predicted 
Walter, “he would spring into immediate prominence.  Already the mystery of his 
mission has put his name into the mouth of every politician and in every newspaper in 
this country.  Watch him.”213 
 Webster Davis spent three months in southern Africa at the start of the war, 
incorporating visits to the Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, and the South African 
Republic alike.  When he returned to the United States, he did indeed begin a lecture tour, 
and scandalized many of his fellow Republicans (not least the administration) by his full-
throated endorsement of the Republikeinse cause, sentiments that he soon committed to 
paper in his book John Bull’s Crime, or Assaults on Republics, published a few months 
after his return. 
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 John Bull’s Crime examines southern African subjects through self-consciously 
American eyes, even to the point of communicating insecurity.  A biographical note at 
the beginning states that “in addition to being American-born, [Webster Davis] was born 
an American, that is, with a heart that pulsates with pure American blood and quickens to 
the inspiration of American sentiment.”214  Eager to avoid charges that Davis was a 
traitor or a tool of American immigrant constituencies, the note emphasizes his 
Americanness above all else.  “An adherent of the doctrine that all men are created equal 
and that no government is good enough to govern another without the other’s consent,” 
the publishers continue, 
it was natural that he should lift his eloquent voice and pen in behalf of the mighty 
farmers of South Africa, who have been making the same fight and against the 
same power that our Revolutionary sires made for America a century and a 
quarter ago.215 
 
 As detailed and eloquent as Davis’s account was, it was much more than an 
opinionated analysis of a foreign conflict.  It is a work concerned with fundamentally 
domestic goals, not least of which being Davis’s own political future—his African trip 
forced him to switch partisan allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic Party.  
The foremost these goals, however, was the spread of Anglophilia and capitalism in the 
United States.  To Webster Davis, the Republikeinse possessed “the very characteristics 
we most admire in our own people, namely, the good nature, the generous spirit, the 
kindheartedness, the affection for their families and their frank and manly 
independence.”216  The Republikeinse, in his estimation, were upstanding but firm—
liberty-lovers fighting for a cause that too many Americans had lost sight of since 1776.   
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 Davis’s concern for America is vividly illustrated by two contrasting images of 
American martial patriotism: the first in a London theatre before departing for Cape 
Town, and the second in Pretoria with members of the Irish Brigade, one of a handful of 
American-led commandoes with the Republikeinse forces.  In the first tableau Anglo-
American rapprochement is literally performed on stage, as Davis looks on in with an 
appropriately theatrical horror: 
An American actress, who seemed to be quite well known to the English nobility, 
was requested to recite “The Absent Minded Beggar.”217 On the stage, standing 
immediately behind her, were two squads of soldiers, one in the American 
uniform, the other in the British uniform. At the head of one squad was the British 
flag, at the head of the other was the American flag. At the close of her recitation 
the actress stepped back behind the two flags and tied their corners into a knot, 
while the audience arose to their feet and, led by the orchestra, sang with great 
enthusiasm “God Save the Queen” and “Rule Britannia.”  
To me that scene was not an inspiring one.  For, when I remembered that 
my ancestors fought and died to make my flag the flag of the greatest republic in 
all the  world, and fought against the same monarchy that endeavored to make 
that Union Jack, which appeared on this occasion tied to my flag, rule 
triumphantly over my republic as a British colony; and when I remembered that 
this American flag, now joined with the British flag, the symbol of tyranny and 
oppression, had always been regarded heretofore as the emblem of freedom and 
as the banner of a “government of the people, by the people and for the people,” 
and that to liberty-loving people everywhere its stars had always appeared as the 
morning stars of God and its stripes as beams of morning light, it seemed to me 
that it had a tendency to make it appear that the people of our republic were in 
sympathy with a monarchy in its efforts to crush two little republics modeled and 
patterned after our own republic, and which was endeavoring to rob and murder 
the men and women and children of those two little republics, who were making 
the same fight for liberty, for home, for justice and for equality, and for 
republican form of government, as our fathers made in the time of the Revolution, 
when in 1776 they performed deeds of valor that wedded their names to glory and 
undying fame.218 
 
All this in spite of the fact that “notwithstanding that [sympathetic] feeling toward 
Americans,” the British were 
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so egotistical and overbearing that an American could not converse with them 
more than a few minutes at a time without being insulted by them, because of 
their domineering ways.  Unconsciously they would refer to the United States and 
its people as inferior.  In fact, you would think, listening to their references to 
certain parts of our own country and  its people, that we were more or less in a 
savage state, and that we were scarcely superior to the Boers.219 
 
 For Webster Davis, the fight that the Thirteen Colonies began in 1775 at 
Lexington and Concord was not yet resolved, notwithstanding present Anglo-American 
“friendship.”  The haughtiness and despotism that marked Britain’s approach to the rest 
of the world in the eighteenth century for Davis had not subsided, though many in the 
United States and particularly within the Republican Party argued that a new era had 
dawned.  In Davis’s view, the true legacy of the Revolution did not reside at 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue with President McKinley but rather in Pretoria with President 
Kruger (“like Abraham Lincoln…a plain, homely, kind-hearted man”), where both 
Dutch-speakers and their sympathetic American comrades still held fast to their 
republican values.220  That the soul of America was perhaps easier to find abroad than at 
home is suggested by Davis’s emotional meeting with the Irish Brigade: 
It is impossible for me to describe the warmth of the welcome extended to me by 
these fellow countrymen. Their enthusiasm was boundless. Some of them laughed 
and some cried like children, and some shouted like Comanche Indians, when 
they realized that an American was in their camp direct from home. They were 
heart and soul in sympathy with the Boers, and begged me upon my return home 
to do everything possible to acquaint our countrymen of their stand taken on the 
side of right. Before leaving their camp I was forced to stand with them in a group 
and have our picture taken beneath their only flag, and that was a faded banner of 
the Stars and Stripes. Of the many pathetic incidents of my trip to South Africa 
none was more affecting to me than the separation from these American boys, 
who, I believe, should be enrolled among the world’s greatest heroes, for they 
were not risking life for their own country and their own liberties, but for  the 
salvation and perpetuity of free institutions of other lands and for the liberties of 
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other  peoples. Those of that little band who still live will be honored by all who 
love liberty, and the names of those who died shall never be forgotten.221 
 
 For all its descriptions of the southern African landscape and the nuts and bolts of 
the situation there, John Bull’s Crime at least as much about America as it is about the 
Transvaal or even Paul Kruger.  For Davis, the war and the way pro-British Americans 
have regarded the war bespeak a deeply troubling turn towards the capitalistic and anti-
republican values of the Old World.  According to Davis, the America of the Revolution 
remains the ideal America, and with 1776 in mind the misguided spirit of Anglo-Saxon 
cooperation can be properly discarded. 222   John Bull’s Crime exemplifies the 
preoccupation with historical Americanness that would pervade the rhetoric of the pro-
Boer movement, not always going so far as to vilify, with Webster Davis, a “haughty, 
blood-stained” British elite, but always ascribing fault for the tragedy of the war in 
solemn tones to backward and perfidious British values—social, moral, and civic.223   
 Reframing the southern African story in terms of the American story was an 
effective rhetorical tactic for both the pro-British and pro-Republikeinse writers that 
employed it.  By doing so, as this chapter has already shown in the writing of Johannes 
Hrolf Wisby and others, the arena of debate surrounding the war could be widened 
beyond those who could claim any firsthand understanding of the conflict between Briton 
and burgher, and America’s thirst for information on southern Africa could be sated, 
however imperfectly.  American history was  fertile ground for a war of metaphors, and 
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indeed, in the case of Webster Davis, critics wasted no time occupying the new 
landscape.  Robert Hutcheson, a former Ohio state senator, was the one of the first pro-
British writers to respond to Davis, releasing a pamphlet entitled An American View of 
the Transvaal Question in late April 1900.224  He was joined a few months later—as the 
presidential election season heated up—by the retired Colonel W.F. Cloud, whose 
pamphlet, Webster Davis on Toast, also aimed to defeat Davis on his own patriotic 
turf.225  
 Hutcheson and Cloud endeavor to do this by inverting Davis’s dichotomy that 
presents the Republikeinse burghers as symbols of ancient American liberty.  “Our 
people naturally and properly sympathize with struggles for liberty the world over,” 
Hutcheson admits, citing American support for the Greek, Hungarian, and Cuban 
independence movements, but the Republikeinse “are not at all in the same category,” for 
contrary to the purposes of liberty, they are engaged in “an unjustifiable revolt.”226  Cloud 
goes even further in assailing the Republics’ republican credentials, contrasting the racial 
regime of the the Transvaal unfavorably to the United States in a possible bid to attract 
black Republican votes away from the ostensibly pro-Republikeinse Democratic ticket: 
Mr. Davis, while I write, music in the street attracts my attention. I look out and 
see a band composed of colored musicians. Negroes in regalia as members of a 
secret and social order, in column, are on parade. At their own sweet will they fill 
the streets, while colored men and women keeping step are walking on the 
sidewalk. They are enjoying liberty, sweet liberty, and have equal rights under the 
laws of this Republic.  
This they could not do in the Transvaal where you find the model 
republics, the republic of that “rugged old burgher, Oom Paul.” If they attempted 
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to do so they would all be flogged and at the end of the punishment receive 
another lash, if they did not say, “thank you.”227 
 
 In both pamphlets the enumerated facts of the situation in southern Africa become 
a means of talking about what “republicanism” means.  Surely it means freedom, but 
whose freedom?  Whom should it protect and whom should it exclude as dangerous to 
the body politic?  Perhaps most importantly, how might America’s new importance on 
the world stage alter America’s answers to these questions?  As Hutcheson argues, 
America’s growing clout should inspire more and not less solicitude in what its citizens 
do and say.  “As citizens of the world,” according to Hutcheson,  
it is a breach of national etiquette for any citizen, high or low, to attempt to array 
our people in favor of one and against another of two belligerents. If Mr. Davis’ 
talk should develop into action by any of his deluded followers, he and they 
would be liable to arrest for violation of our neutrality laws.228  
 
Republicans like Cloud drew attention to the increasing stridency of Democratic rhetoric 
over the Transvaal issue as the 1900 election drew closer; Cloud quotes one Democratic 
orator as remarking that a simple expression of displeasure by the American president 
“clothed with the power of eighty millions of people, when he grasps the scepter of 
power and reigns as the people’s Tribune at Washington,” will be suffice to immediately 
stop the British war effort.229  In this new century, according to some, “the ipse dixit, the 
word of America, will be enough.”230  Yet according to Cloud, more prudent Americans 
understood that the careless advocacy of foreign causes in an era of mass culture could 
have grave geopolitical consequences.  Natural-born Americans must not be tempted to 
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join their immigrant brethren in disturbing the subdued decorum essential to successful 
geopolitical balance: 
Talk about foreign “entanglements.” It could take no worse shape than for our 
citizens—native or foreign-born—to unite and divide for party purposes on the 
affairs of outside nations. For writing a letter to a former British subject a few 
years ago advising him how to vote in a presidential election, a British Minister 
had to quit the country. But the Anglo-American citizen himself would not have 
been justified if he had voted, or persuaded other citizens of British birth to vote 
in the supposed interest of Great Britain. Such a policy might lead to the total 
absorption of one country by another, or foment faction and civil war.231  
 
 The story of Webster Davis ended not with a bang but a whimper.  Less than a 
week after returning to the United States he quit his post as Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior and announced his partisan switch.  Thereafter he devoted his considerable 
oratorical talent to campaigning for the Republikeinse cause and the Democratic 
presidential nominee, William Jennings Bryan.  After some initial successes—an anti-war 
petition he supported amassed an impressive 212,604 signatures (the equivalent of almost 
900,000 signatures in today’s America)—but rumors began to plague his speaking tour.  
In April 1900, a man named Oscar Epstein alleged in the pages of The New York Times 
that Davis was in fact a paid agent of President Kruger, who “would consider $50,000 a 
cheap price for the intervention of the United States.”232  The allegations persisted, and in 
1904, two years after the war, Davis was arrested along with C.W. van der Hoogt and 
Samuel Pearson, two other pro-Republikeinse propagandists, for accepting money in 
secret from the South African Republic.  Davis, however, was soon released for health 
reasons (though he lived until 1923), and the true facts of the case would not be known 
until 1946, when the recollections of Transvaal State Secretary F.W. Reitz were finally 
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published. In his memoirs Reitz admitted Davis had in fact received advance payment in 
gold bars while visiting Pretoria almost a half-century earlier.233   The possibility of 
foreign influence in American politics was not such a crackpot theory after all. 
 ——  
 Unsurprisingly, among the boldest expressions of metaphorical appropriation 
during the South African War were the province of writers who would never go to Africa 
and who had no firsthand information on the circumstances of the conflict.  Once again 
fixating on the thorny debates over American republicanism and identity that the war 
inspired, Charles Francis Adams, Jr.’s late 1901 lecture to the American Antiquarian 
Society, entitled “The Confederacy and the Transvaal: A People’s Obligation to Robert 
E. Lee,” is a prime example.234  Delivered over a year after Britain’s capture of Pretoria, 
by which time the war had fully shifted into its ugly guerrilla chapter, Adams 
appropriated American history to construct a counter-narrative to the popular pro-
Republikeinse refrain that the war being fought was a reflection of the American 
Revolution.  Yet the primary goal of the work, as suggested by its title, was not to make 
sense of southern African nuances at all.  Instead, “The Confederacy and the Transvaal” 
was out to serve the cause of post-Civil War white reconciliation—an important cause in 
which a Boston 97rahmin like Adams felt he could have a helpful impact.235 
 It should be noted that while Adams was not the first to compare the war in 
southern Africa to the American Civil War, he was probably the most effective to do so 
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in print.  Earlier that year the Pan-German League of New York had released a pamphlet 
by the Reverend Diedrich von Slooten, “late a predikant in the South African Republic,” 
entitled “The Boer War; Its Parallel with America’s Great Struggle, an Appeal to 
Christian Americans.”236  Displaying an inexcusable misunderstanding of the facts (and, 
quite possibly, the outcome) of the American Civil War, von Slooten recalls how “the 
Christian ministers of America appealed to Christians all over the world to raise their 
voices for suffering humanity and stop the war.”237  The pamphlet ends by reprinting a 
Civil War era petition “from a conference of ministers of the Gospel in the city of 
Richmond,” protesting the “indefensible acts” of the Union army, complete with 
subtitles: “Permanent [Confederate] Independence a Certainty—the Same with the Boer 
Republics.”238  A few less embarrassing attempts are also worth noting: the writings of 
the British military commentator H. Spenser Wilkinson, which compared the 
Republikeinse zeal for independence to the Southern “Lost Cause,” and the journalist 
James F.J. Archibald’s Blue Shirt and Khaki: A Comparison, in which the Civil War, not 
unexpectedly, looms large in the book’s understanding of the American military.239 
 A scion of the same Adams family that produced two early presidents, Charles 
Francis Adams, Jr. was a consummate Massachusetts patrician.  The brother of the 
famous memoirist Henry Adams, and the son of a congressman and distinguished 
wartime diplomat, Charles Jr. had large shoes to fill, and has been regarded by many 
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historians as a mediocre figure, whose sojourns into business, the military, and 
government never amounted to much.  The writing of local history, however, was a 
kinder to Adams as a vocation, and in 1895 he was elected president of the Massachusetts 
Historical Society.240   From 1900 to 1901 he served a term as the president of the 
American Historical Society, just as his views of the Transvaal crisis were crystallizing.  
Mediocre as he may have been, when Adams rose to speak on matters of national 
interest, he found an attentive audience. 
 In The Confederacy and the Transvaal, Adams used the awful news of destruction 
and famine coming out of southern Africa to shore up the legacy of the Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee as an American hero.  According to Adams, Lee was the 
mastermind of “the hair-breadth escape we ourselves had from a similar experience”—
his 1865 decision to surrender to Ulysses S. Grant instead of scattering his troops and 
attempting to mount a feeble resistance in the wilderness.241   In Adams’s view, the 
success of efforts at national reconciliation since the war must not be allowed to obscure 
the terrific consequences that would have followed a decision not to surrender at 
Appomattox, for some at the time believed that the loss of Richmond “would be but the 
close of one phase of the war and the opening of another”:242 
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[R]ecalling the circumstances of that time, it is fairly appalling to consider what in 
1865 must have occurred, had Robert E. Lee then been of the same turn of mind 
as was [Confederate President] Jefferson Davis, or as implacable and unyielding 
in disposition as Kruger or [Republikeinse General Louis] Botha have more 
recently proved. The national government had in arms a million men, inured to 
the hardships and accustomed to the brutalities of war; Lincoln had been freshly 
assassinated; the temper of the North was thoroughly aroused, while its patience 
was exhausted. An irregular warfare would inevitably have resulted, a warfare 
without quarter. The Confederacy would have been reduced to a smoldering 
wilderness,—to what South Africa to-day is. In such a death grapple, the North, 
both in morale and in means, would have suffered only less than the South. From 
both sections that fate was averted.243 
 
 In the same way one might take issue with W.F. Cloud’s optimistic assessment of 
the position of African Americans in the post-Civil War United States, it could easily be 
argued (then as now) that large swathes of the Confederacy were, in fact, reduced to a 
smoldering wilderness, and that, particularly in the border states, the conflict was warfare 
without quarter.  “The Confederacy and the Transvaal,” with its balanced posture of 
mutual culpability and mutual honor for both Northern and Southern whites, embodies 
well the historically suspect but rhetorically powerful message of reconciliation literature.  
Indeed, by setting the Civil War against the backdrop of Africa (as a moral example, no 
less), what might otherwise be considered America’s greatest tragedy—a sign of the 
implicit contradictions in American republicanism—became yet another sign of 
American greatness.  “Isolationism,” for Adams and other pro-British writers, did not 
mean full American withdrawal from world affairs, but rather leadership by moral 
example rather than aggressive diplomacy.244 
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 It was hardly a surprise that Adams’s lecture provoked the progressive historian 
Sydney George Fisher, who fired back on January 19th, 1902 with a long letter to the 
Philadelphia Sunday Times, later published as a pamphlet under the title The American 
Revolution and the Boer War.245  Fisher was the Pennsylvania-born son of a prominent 
essayist and diarist (named, confusingly, Sidney George Fisher), and had followed his 
father’s path, writing extensively in favor of various progressive causes such as 
immigration restriction and civil service reform, as well as publishing several works on 
colonial history and the American Revolution—so-called “muckraking histories” that 
challenged celebratory interpretations of the American past.246  Just a few months after 
writing his letter to Charles Francis Adams, Fisher published his most comprehensive 
work yet, The True History of the American Revolution, a tome whose introduction 
accused orthodox historians of seeking “to build up nationality, and to check sectionalism 
and rebellion” as opposed to pursuing historical truth, and countering them with the 
assertion that “the Revolution was a much more ugly and unpleasant affair than most of 
us imagine.”247 
 Fisher in The American Revolution and the Boer War energetically exposed the 
inconsistency implicit in Adams’s honor focused theory of the American Civil War, 
sarcastically raising the specter of Adams’s famous patriot forebears: 
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In other words, you go so far as to say that when a people are fighting for their 
political integrity and independence, a hopeless struggle for it ought not to be 
prolonged beyond what may be called the point of scientific defeat. Rather than 
prolong it to desperation and death in the last ditch it is much better and more 
sensible to accept a dependent position of some sort, the position of a crown 
colony, or a charter colony with more or less varying degrees of colonial control, 
all of which your very unwise and altogether reckless great grandfather John 
Adams, and some of his friends used to describe as “political slavery.”248 
 
Modern American society, according to Fisher, was controlled by moneyed corporate 
interests and corrupt political bosses, and Adams exemplified both as a former 
government official and erstwhile president of the Union Pacific Railroad.  At any rate, 
far from discouraging discord and foreign entanglement as promised, Adams’s doctrine 
of “yielding at once to overwhelming power” had the actual consequence of inviting the 
tyranny of the strong over the weak in the interest of stability.249  Turning the question of 
outnumbered resistance back onto the United States, Fisher submitted a pointed question: 
If the European powers, disgusted with the success of our protective tariff and 
rising commercial supremacy, should unite to abolish our lynch law, burning of 
negroes at the stake, municipal corruption and some other matters, their armies 
and fleets would outnumber us even more than the English outnumber the Boers; 
and I suppose if you are really as much of a “quitter” as you profess to be you 
would then still preach your doctrine of submission.250 
 
 Fisher’s aim was to turn Adams’s metaphor on its head: rather than the American 
Civil War providing a moral example for the Republikeinse, it is the South African 
War—even in its ugly guerrilla phase—that is truly exemplary.  For Lee’s honor, 
according to Fisher, was not the key factor in the end of the Civil War (his devotion to 
the cause, Fisher explains, was lukewarm at best), but rather it was the liberal terms 
offered by General Grant that effected the miracle of Appomattox.  If a true 
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Revolutionary spirit had truly guided Southerners, Fisher argued, “the eleven southern 
states would be now either independent or in the condition of Ireland.”251  In the frank 
spirit of progressive polemic, the Republikeinse guerrillas, and not Americans like 
Adams, in Fisher’s view acted as the true standard-bearers of the American Revolution—
warts and all, for 
Now that we have settled down and become a great nation all this seems like very 
foolish business to some of us who cut off coupons or sit at roll top desks 
endorsing the backs of documents until we have lost the natural feeling of 
vigorous manhood so characteristic of the Boers and the followers of Washington. 
We have forgotten our revolution. Our own acts in it now seem too heroic for our 
stomachs when we see others practicing them.252 
 
When the historical record is actually examined closely, Fisher explained that the patriots 
of old “created by means of tar and feathers…a reign of terror throughout the whole 
land.”  General Washington, for his part, “was prepared to become the worst kind of a 
guerrilla,” yet “the moral position of the Boers was vastly stronger than was ours.”  
Furthermore “though receiving far greater provocation than we received,” Fisher insisted 
that actually the Republikeinse “have behaved much better.” 253   The pig-headed 
American patriots of the eighteenth century had stopped at nothing to secure their 
“absolute independence,” rejecting several gracious British proposals for peace 
throughout the 1770s.  “Your great grandfather was a Kruger,” Fisher gleefully 
explained.254  In its final section, The American Revolution and the Boer War returned to 
the lessons America has for the world—and argued that the U.S. had always been 
instrumental in nudging Britain towards liberalism in its institutions and practices: 
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If [Great Britain] had the courage of her convictions and intentions and was not 
afraid of the outcry of the civilized world, she would be much shorter and quicker 
in her work with the Boers. She would surround the concentration camps of Boer 
women and children with machine guns and pump into the mass of humanity until 
that heroic race was extinct.  But she prefers the safer and more veiled, but 
equally infamous, method of slow starvation and disease, of banishment and 
imprisonment in distant countries to extinguish a race which she hates because 
she knows she has always done them evil and wrong and because they excel her 
own people in morals, military intelligence and courage. 
 … 
Real liberty and free government, the rights of the laboring  man, have grown  
 during the last century in England out of American precept and example. 
 … 
 It remains for us to teach her to be just to the Boers.255 
 
 In the work of both Adams and Fisher the facts and subtleties of the situation in 
southern Africa are clearly subordinated to the authors’ views of American identity and 
meaning—the real stars of the show.  What might initially appear simply to be the use of 
historical metaphor to elucidate a contemporary situation in Africa soon shows itself to 
be, if anything, the reverse: in the work of Adams and Fisher it is the real event, the 
South African War, that is called upon as an object lesson and prism to aid in 
illuminating the American story and determining the ever elusive nature of “real 
Americanness.”  For Adams, real Americanness lay in chivalry and pragmatism, 
grounded in principle but finding its best manifestation in compromise and republican 
civic virtue—a sense of virtue the Republikeinse lack who insist on fighting the British 
past all possibility of victory, allowing their own land to be torched and their women and 
children interned.  For Fisher, compromise meant compromise with corruption—a 
pernicious quality of British governance since at least 1763.  Fisher’s choice for the true 
American virtue was dogged determination, an ancestral and uncompromising attachment 
to liberty that saw its way through the messy years of the Revolution and was now 
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threatened by the equally malign forces of latter-day Anglophilia.  For both, American 
history not so much a lens through which Americans might better understand a faraway 
conflict, but rather the subject itself.  The egocentric cry, “if only the belligerents could 
follow our example,” rang out loudly from both, but the real truth was that that example 
was the real topic of debate.  If America was to grow into its status as one of the world’s 
foremost nations, the Revolution and the Civil War had to be dealt with in a productive 
way, and soon.  If, as Tyler Dennett has argued, “the emergence of the United States as a 
world power” did not occur until the South African War, such strident writing on both 
sides of the issue anticipated the idea of American indispensability in global affairs that 
would persist into the twentieth century.256 
 Outside official American diplomatic history, with a few exceptions, it is 
relatively uncommon to encounter detailed analyses of international events as they were 
seen through American eyes.  There is, in a great deal of mainstream historiography, a 
construction of American history in two phases—a provincial-isolationist phase starting 
with the American Revolution and a cosmopolitan-activist phase following after it at 
some point, providing perhaps for a roughly fifty year window of contestation between 
1900 and the end of World War II in which the isolationist and activist phases of 
American history could be contested.  In the provincial-isolationist phase, international 
events are cast as mostly irrelevant to Americans, who prided themselves on their 
separation from Old World intrigues.  By contrast, in the cosmopolitan-activist phase no 
international event occurs without the United States playing a central, if not essential 
role.  Consequently one finds few examples of a major overseas event in which 
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Americans were deeply interested without eventually intervening.  The South African 
War is an important case study for those interested in disrupting this crude schema, which 
is deeply and fundamentally flawed.  Already within the context of this paper the range 
and importance of American trade and the missionary impulse of both white and  
African-American groups give the lie to the notion that nineteenth century Americans 
were unconcerned with what went on outside their frontiers.  Indeed, as the United States 
reached its zenith of power in the late twentieth century, Francis Fukuyama’s infamous 
thesis that history had reached its triumphal endpoint barely left the presses before 
rapidly disintegrating in the face of events to which the United States neglected to pay 
attention and could scarcely control.257  Studying the South African War can be uniquely 
helpful in rectifying this issue because of its paradoxical isolation from and importance to 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century America.  Unlike, for example, the gruesome 
Philippine-American War that raged alongside the conflict in southern Africa, the United 
States was not involved militarily—one’s patriotism in the traditional civic-martial sense 
was not generally at issue simply by opposing the war.  Yet patriotism in a broader 
sense—as a need to express and stand up for what was authentically “American”—was 
absolutely at the heart of the struggle.   The South African War brought to light deep 
cleavages that existed among Americans in discussing what were theoretically mutually 
understood concepts like the nature of Americanness.  By shining more light on the 
actions, rhetoric, and ultimate failure of the American pro-Republikeinse movement, 
these cleavages will be further interrogated and exposed. 
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Chapter IV: “Pro-Boers” At Bay 
The American Pro-Republikeinse and the Challenges of Domestic Activism 
 
“As in 1776 so today, the laying of the farms and homes of the South Africans desolate 
by fire and sword, declaring war against the national rights of all mankind and extirpating 
the defenders of liberty there, is the concern of every right minded and honest-hearted 
American citizen, and if we stand by tamely permitting ‘Liberty to be assassinated,’ we 
must expect American to suffer the same humiliation and degradation which has befallen 
Greece and Rome, which has befallen Venice and Genoa, for they all exist today only in 
name.” 
—Jan Krige, South African Republic Police Commandant, speaking in Detroit, 
Michigan, December 1901.258 
 
“By the way, do you remember one night in the ‘Scott’ when I gave you my version of 
Hammond’s share in the Jameson Raid, and your saying how glad you were to get the 
truth about him, as you had always wanted to like him, and that now knowing the truth, 
you could.  It is funny to think you now are friends.  He is one of the Best Ever, and, so 
are you.” 
—Richard Harding Davis to Frederick Russell Burnham, Minnesota native and 
former  Chief of Scouts for the British Army in southern Africa, June 13th, 
1906.259 
 
 The story of how pro-Republikeinse rhetoric and activism in the United States 
both did and did not translate into concrete action during the South African War is in 
many ways a difficult to tell, for to do justice to it requires an understanding of diverse 
segments in American society, from the women who provided the “feet on the ground” 
for most organizations, to individuals in the employ of the Republikeinse governments, 
right up to the U.S. State Department and the presidency.  Of all these relevant categories 
however, it is the nuts and bolts level of “pro-Boer” organizing that has been the most 
neglected by scholars and is most worthy of this investigation’s attention.260   
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 During the Transvaal War of 1881—accompanying angry headlines about British 
imperialism—press reports indicate that some limited pro-Boer organizing did occur, 
though on a small scale and along largely ethnic (Dutch-American) lines.  A report in The 
Washington Post of February 17th describes a meeting in a private home, where attendees 
were urged “to make the voice of the Dutchmen of New York heard by the British 
government.”261  “The attendance was not large,” however, and nothing much came of it.  
The next year a lecture by the prominent Irish-American Republikeinse fighter Alfred 
Aylward only half-filled the Cooper Union building in New York.262  When war broke 
out in 1899, the Orange Free State boasted an consul in Philadelphia—Charles Pierce—
and Gen. James O’Beirne, a Civil War veteran, claimed to the Transvaal’s official 
representative in the U.S., but since both were American citizens (Pierce had never been 
to Africa at all) the State Department recognized neither officially.263 
 Pro-Republikeinse activism in the United States waxed and waned through 
roughly four phases.  Widespread interest in the early Republikeinse successes and the 
novelty of the war buoyed the movement through its first several months, but trailed off 
through the spring of 1900 as the Republikeinse commandoes began to retreat and 
abandon their capitals.  William Jennings Bryan’s defeat in the election of 1900 was a 
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further blow to the movement.  Between the spring of 1900 and the fall of 1901 the most 
committed activists continued to press for action to stop the war, and the writings of 
journalists and participants kept the conflict on the minds of many, but the expectation of 
imminent Republikeinse defeat hamstrung efforts at organization.  Yet from the fall of 
1901 through the end of the war in mid-1902, the pro-Republikeinse movement 
underwent a partial rejuvenation, as guerrilla successes and the unfolding horror of 
British humanitarian atrocities came to light.  A push to end mule transit between 
Louisiana and South Africa was just gaining steam by the time the war abruptly ended in 
mid-1902.  The postwar phase of the pro-Republikeinse movement played itself out in the 
years afterwards, as humanitarian organizations saw to the welfare of Republikeinse 
prisoners of war, and some die-hard organizers pressed for opening the United States to 
subsidized Republikeinse settlement. 
 In October 1899 the Oval Office released a statement acknowledging the great 
number of petitions President McKinley had already received imploring him (variously) 
to admonish Great Britain, admonish the Republics, offer arbitration, or offer mediation 
between the two sides, possibly as part of an international initiative.264  Its response to 
these calls (despite Secretary of State Hay’s marked pro-British leanings), the 
administration issued a statement of strict neutrality.  Neutrality, however, was not as 
simple as it sounded.  American businesses that lacked any means of trading with the 
landlocked Republikeinse continued to trade with the British government, who were 
deeply interested in purchasing mules, horses, and basic provisions in the United States—
much to the chagrin of pro-Republikeinse activists.  Indeed, the American contributions 
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to the British war effort are well-remembered even today in south Africa  “The first 
wagon into Ladysmith [the site of a months-long Republikeinse siege] was loaded with 
Quaker Oats, Sunlight Soap, Armour Beef and Fairbanks Beef,” observed the American 
war correspondent Richard Harding Davis, adding that “as a matter of fact almost 
everything in South Africa is of American make.”265  Louis Changuion chooses to end 
Uncle Sam, Oom Paul en John Bull by waxing lyrically about the invasive yet beautiful 
cosmos flowers that bloom each autumn by South African roads, brought there originally 
by American beasts of burden during the war.266  
—— 
 For many Americans, then, the administration’s position was plainly 
unsatisfactory.  The war was clearly being fought for the wrong reasons, pitting a strong, 
capitalist empire, against two weak states that seemed to share America’s republican 
values and frontier ethos.  But the pro-Republikeinse found it difficult to speak with a 
coherent voice.  A number of factors account for this, the most obvious being the 
ludicrous profusion of organizations dedicated somehow to the Republikeinse cause.  
From the Morton House Group to the American Transvaal League, the  
Boer Independence Organisation, the Boer Relief Fund and the American Raad for the 
Relief of the South African Republics, the relatively small clique of pro-Republikeinse 
movement leaders found themselves frequently divided and at odds.   
 First of all, there was an ongoing debate over direction: what did activists want?  
Should the pro-Republikeinse press for an end to the war, with peace negotiations 
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possibly resulting in a Anglophilic South African union, or should they press for total 
Republikeinse independence?  Montagu White, the envoy broadly in charge of European 
and American pro-Republikeinse efforts, was criticised by many of the pro-
Republikeinse Americans with whom he corresponded for his cautious, state-centered 
approach to lobbying, reluctant to support the Democratic ticket at the 1900 presidential 
election and adamant that President Kruger should not visit the United States.  
Organizations closely associated with him pitched their efforts as non-partisan and anti-
war, lobbying for a brokered peace rather than British withdrawal.  To native-born true 
believers like Edward Seymour Wilde, staunch Democrat and president of the New 
Jersey-based Boer Independence Association, such an approach smacked of cowardice.  
The manuscript of a letter to the editor he composed in March 1901 (near the mid-war 
doldrums of pro-Republikeinse activism) gives a sense not only of his contempt for 
White’s oversight but also the general internecine bitterness prevailing in the movement: 
I am sorry to state that it is said here that Mr. Montague White [sic.] has gone 
from here to Europe as a representative of what is said to be called, although I 
cannot locate it, The American Transvaal League, the object being to promote a 
compromise on the part of the Boers with Great Britain, other than on the basis of 
independence. 
If this should unfortunately prove to be true, it seems to me that such 
notion  should be regarded in the light of an impertinence, and that the 
consideration moving an advocacy of such a curse should be carefully 
investigated.267 
 
 Wilde goes on to compare the Republikeinse position to Washington’s army at 
Valley Forge and declare Charles Pierce to be (in contrast to White) “one of the truest 
and best friends of the Boer cause in this Country.”268  It is highly unlikely that Wilde 
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was unaware of the American Transvaal League.  Under the leadership of Peter van 
Vlissingen, it was one of the most important pro-Republikeinse organizations, closely 
tied to Montagu White and the official propaganda effort.  After all, just seven months 
later van Vlissingen and Wilde would be corresponding; in October 1901, as allegations 
of mismanagement of various widows’ and orphans’ relief funds began to dog Charles 
Pierce, van Vlissingen and White would beseech Wilde to extract “an itemized financial 
statement” from the would-be Free State consul.269  The two had good reason to worry: 
just a year earlier, in July 1900, an similar scandal had been picked up by The New York 
Times, which reported giddily that the Boer Relief Fund under Patrick O’Farrell and 
W.A. Croffut had spent almost all of the money raised at pro-Republikeinse rallies to 
fund receptions and further meetings—all but eighteen dollars.  “In other words,” it 
sneered, “981/2 per cent of the money collected has been used in an unsuccessful effort to 
produce on American politics and effect harmful to the Administration, and 11/2 percent 
of it will—or may—go toward relieving the sufferings of wounded and hungry 
burghers.”270  And the infighting did not stop there.  Charles Pierce, George Van Siclen 
and Samuel Pearson—three of the nation’s most important pro-Republikeinse 
organizers—all despised each other, and when the patriotic Transvaal policeman Jan 
Krige arrived in Louisiana on his long American lecture tour, Pearson accused him of 
being a British agent.271  All of this boded poorly for an activist movement. 
 The pro-Republikeinse movement as a whole fluctuated wildly between vehement 
anti-imperial polemic and earnest appeals to the British conscience, humanitarian concern 
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for widows, orphans and prisoners of war, and hardline commitment to Republikeinse 
independence, non-partisan appeals to shared American values and ethnocentric anti-
Republican invective.  Little wonder, then, that the pro-Republikeinse opened themselves 
up to derision in the pro-British press, where they were characterized as vicious 
Anglophobes and tools of Democratic machine politics. Even on an individual level, 
activists’ true goals were not always clear.  This was particularly true for the respectable 
women who served as key foot soldiers for so many of the pro-Republikeinse 
organizations.  Jessie Fara, who organized for both the Women’s Auxiliary to the Boer 
Relief Fund in the New York area and served as secretary of the Women’s South African 
League, devoted herself publicly to organizing genteel fundraisers and humanitarian 
initiatives on behalf of the Republikeinse while privately harboring a vehement hatred for 
the British: 
The Boers are the only Christian people that are not savage.  And they make me 
angry because they are so good.  Why didn’t they kill all of those monsters 
[British soldiers] they caught instead of letting them go?  Don’t they know every 
one of those creatures killed makes the earth just that much more pure? 
You have made a just mistake about me.  I’m not good.  I don’t want to be 
good.  I’d love to furnish some of the oil to boil some of those missionaries in 
China [a reference to the Boxer Rebellion].  But of course the Chinese are like the 
Boers[;] they wouldn’t use it272 
 
In a similar position was a Mrs. Anna Lehlbach, who lamented in November 1900 that 
she was “not proud of being an American any longer.”273  Her husband, she complained, 
had too great a business interest in Britain to join the pro-Republikeinse cause himself, 
but she found ways to do her bit.  Her drawings inspired by Emily Hobhouse’s famous 
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reportage on British concentration camps would grace the walls at pro-Republikeinse 
women’s meetings Fara helped organize in the spring of 1902.274 
 Ethnicity also presented a challenge.  It has already been seen how eager pro-
Republikeinse writers were to stress their commitment to American-ness; this all the 
more because of the perception that pro-Boer movements were composed chiefly of 
immigrant elements, their professed love of American-style republicanism but concealing 
nothing but ancient “racial” feuds and geopolitical gamesmanship.  This was certainly a 
concern of Mary B. Southall, whose January 1900 letter to the ardently pro-British 
navalist writer Alfred Mahan praised him “for so strongly speaking up for the many real 
Americans whose sympathies are with the British,” adding that she did not “think 
because the Irish, and the German and the Dutchman in this county, stir up pro Boer 
movements all over the states, that Congress should pass any resolution of theirs, as 
coming from the American people.”275  While there certainly was no shortage native-born 
support for the Republikeinse cause, it was difficult to deny the importance of Irish-
American activists like Rep. Bourke Cockran of New York, associating the movement 
with a radical fringe.  As early as December 1899 rumors circulated that Irish radicals 
planned to invade Canada in retaliation for the war, and it was common knowledge that 
most of the few hundred Americans who actually went to the Transvaal to fight for the 
Republikeinse were of Irish descent.276  Naturally the Dutch-American community also 
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played a  prominent role in pro-Republikeinse activism, a fact underscored by a look at 
the names of prominent figures within organizations; George W. Van Siclen, founder of 
the National Boer Relief Fund and the American Raad for the Assistance of the South 
African Republics, was also a prominent member of the prestigious Holland Society of 
New York, as was his associate Tunis Bergen.  Peter van Vlissingen, C.W. van der 
Hoogt, Herman van der Ploeg and retired Michigan state senator Sybrant Wesselius were 
just a few of the other prominent Dutch Americans involved with the Republikeinse 
cause.  
——— 
 It should be clear by now that, rambunctious as they may have been, the group of 
men and women who led the alphabet soup of pro-Republikeinse organisations was not 
large, and despite their broad distaste for one another, they were all more or less on 
speaking terms.  Their utter lack of discipline notwithstanding, they constituted an elite 
clique in that many of them had southern African contacts.  Unlike most other 
Americans, many pro-Republikeinse leaders had firsthand access to information on 
southern Africa.  They doubtless appreciated this a great deal, but in a way it signified a 
broader problem within pro-Republikeinse activism: the scarcity of people who could 
speak with authority on the situation in southern Africa, and the cliquishness of those 
who could.   
 Because southern Africa was so far from the United States and so unknown to 
most Americans before the war, the total set of people in America who had been to 
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southern Africa was tiny, composed most notably of newspaper correspondents, mining 
engineers, former soldiers, diplomats and Republikeinse envoys (official and unofficial).  
Unsurprisingly, the prospect of writing about and lecturing on their prized insights was a 
powerful draw on such people.  Illustrious pro-British figures like John Hays Hammond 
and Frederick Russell Burnham wrote articles and gave speeches outlining their 
perspectives.  John Y. F. Blake, a West Point graduate from Arkansas who fought in 
commando with the Republikeinse at the beginning of the war, declared earnestly in A 
West Pointer with The Boers that “I do not believe that in the history of the world, one 
could find more acts of barbarity and brutality committed by any people in any land than 
by the English in the two little republics of the Transvaal and the Free State.”277  Charles 
Macrum, former U.S. Consul in Pretoria, returned from Africa a committed pro-Boer, 
like Webster Davis began his own speaking tour, lauding the Republikeinse and 
responding to their racializing critics by certifying them to be “the most magnificent 
specimens of physical manhood imaginable.”278  Yet the Americans coming back from 
southern Africa to educate their brethren and gain publicity for themselves were a clubby 
bunch, not as partisan as they may seem at first.   
 For one thing, most of them knew each other.  Richard Harding Davis, one of the 
most famous journalists to travel to southern Africa during the war, was, for example, a 
consummate social butterfly.  Even as he wrote books and articles celebrating the 
Republikeinse as the most unfairly maligned people in the world, he maintained energetic 
correspondence with both Transvaal State Secretary F.W. Reitz and Winston Churchill at 
the same time.  While lamenting mismanaged the British war effort, he built up strong 
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friendships with both Hammond and Burnham, despite having fundamental differences of 
opinion concerning the direction the war should ideally take.  Davis would go on to 
profile Burnham for a book he would publish in 1906, Real Soldiers of Fortune, and his 
affection for the two men is clear; in one letter he refers to both Hammond and Burnham 
as “the Best Ever.”279  After leaving southern Africa Davis maintained ties to John Y. F. 
Blake (the same pugnacious man whose book derided Frederick Russell Burnham as an 
ignorant fraud), and it was not long before Davis had organized a new fraternal society, 
The Military Order of Pretoria, in order to maintain contact with American veterans of 
the South African War.280  Open only to Americans who had fought for the Transvaal or 
Orange Free State, as well as any non-combatants embedded with that side, there is no 
reason to believe it ever expanded beyond fifteen to twenty members.281  
 For Richard Harding Davis, the South African War was about two things: making 
contacts, and paying the bills.  His letters to his family from southern Africa make this 
clear.  His moment of crisis came in March 1900 while waiting with Lord Roberts’ army 
at Ladysmith—the British army was not about to move for two weeks, and Davis 
despaired over the fact that he had not quite collected enough material for the book he 
had been planning, War and Peace in South Africa.  “I started in too late to do [much] 
with it and as it is I have seen a great deal,” Davis confessed to his mother on March 
15th—“it is neither an interesting country nor an interesting war.”282  By the 25th he was 
detailing his plans to return to America and make amends with his long-suffering wife 
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whom he had left behind at a Cape Town hotel, even giving the name of the German 
steamer on which they were to return.283  On April 14th, however, Davis sent another 
letter refuting everything he had said over the past month about returning to the United 
States and giddily announcing that the American consul had approved his request to visit 
Pretoria.  “This will enable me to write a book from both sides giving my ideas of the 
English in the field and the Boer at home,” Davis explained, “with the exception of 
Churchill who ‘had to’ I shall be the only correspondent who has been permitted to go on 
both sides.”284  That book was written and eventually published under the title With Both 
Armies in South Africa, and met with great success. 
 All of this is simply to show that Richard Harding Davis, like so many other 
opinion shapers during the war, was working on his own behalf, towards his own 
personal goals and not those of a larger movement.  The same can be said of more 
outspoken figures like Macrum and Webster Davis, for though they stirred podiums all 
over the country, they did not involve themselves on a formal basis with the tangle of 
pro-Republikeinse organizations attempting to benefit from their progress.  This is even 
true for high profile Republikeinse visitors to the United States.  Marquis names like 
Daniel Wolmarans, Cornelius Wessels, Abraham Fischer, Jan Krige and the Rev. Herman 
D. van Broekhuizen (the first three men were members of an official deputation of 
Republikeinse envoys who toured the United States twice, first in spring 1900 and then in 
early 1902) determined their movements either independently or at the direction of 
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Montagu White, whose relationship with grassroots activist groups was less than ideal to 
say the least.   
 The same disorganization that hobbled the pro-Republikeinse movement’s ability 
to stand up to the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations opened it up to co-optation 
not only by the beneficiaries of the lecture circuit but also to political manipulation at the 
hands of the Democratic Party.  Eager to exploit anti-imperialist feeling in the wake of 
America’s controversial military entanglement in the Philippines, the 1900 Democratic 
electoral platform appeared to offer up a full-throated endorsement of the pro-
Republikeinse movement: 
[W]e especially condemn the ill-concealed Republican alliance with England, 
which must mean discrimination against other friendly nations, and which has 
already stifled the nation's voice while liberty is being strangled in Africa. 
Believing in the principles of self-government and rejecting, as did our 
forefathers, the claim of monarchy, we view with indignation the purpose of 
England to overwhelm with force the South African Republics. Speaking, as we 
believe, for the entire American nation, except its Republican office-holders and 
for all freemen everywhere, we extend our sympathies to the heroic burghers in 
their unequal struggle to maintain their liberty and independence.285 
 
 Throughout 1900 there was a great deal of pressure on pro-Republikeinse activists 
to align with the Democratic Party, and, to be sure, many hoped for a Bryan victory.  At 
the same time, though, many more circumspect observers felt a sense of unease.  “How I 
hope your prognostics about the election may come true!” wrote Johanna Waszklewicz-
van Schilfgaarde, a Dutch disarmament activist, in an August 1900 letter to Jessie Fara.  
“But even then I have a heavy heart in the future [sic.].  Has not much of the sympathy 
shown to the Boer Envoys been simply an election maneuver and will Mr. Bryan, when 
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President, not be true to his Monroe principles  and abstain from intervention?”286  
Montagu White agreed with that pessimistic assessment.  “The Democrats have been 
warmly espousing the cause of the Boers,” he wrote in a letter to a Transvaal minister, 
“but, from what I have seen, I think most of the professional politicians on their side have 
simply done so as a party move.  The last thing they want the Republicans to do is to 
mediate, for that would take away the essence of their attacks.”287  Indeed, after the 
Democrats lost the 1900 election, the promising pro-Republikeinse overtures stopped.  
The movement, despite the efforts of people like White to rein it in, hobbled on 
weakened by the election and discredited as a craven political gimmick.  It mattered little 
whether the higher-ups were envoys, war correspondents, or politicians: the grassroots of 
the pro-Republikeinse were never able to form strong and productive ties with the 
valuable people their cause depended upon. 
 One could argue that ultimately it was the Philippines that did the pro-
Republikeinse movement in.  The United States had acquired them through the Treaty of 
Paris that ended the war with Spain shortly before the South African War, causing a stir 
at home, and by the middle of 1899 the United States was once again facing full-blown 
war in the Philippines, this time not against the Spanish but against the Filipino people 
themselves, who did not wish to be yoked to the United States in a colonial relationship.  
As reports of American atrocities in the Philippines circulated in the following years, a 
vigorous anti-imperialist movement organized in the United States determined to expose 
examples of American barbarism and heavy-handedness.  Many of the movement’s 
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leaders, like historian and poet W.A. Croffut, were also active in the pro-Repulikeinse 
movement.   
 This was a problem.  Men like Croffut were certainly convinced of the injustice of 
the southern African contest—that was never in doubt—but like the national Democratic 
Party they often saw it as a object lesson to point people towards the real scandal, which 
was much closer to home.  How could the United States speak forcefully to the British on 
the Transvaal issue in light of the situation in the Pacific?  Croffut wasted no time 
mincing words: “John Bull…who murdered two republics in South Africa—even he, 
accustomed to the reek of his own infamy, holds his sensitive nose to protect himself 
from the stench of your atrocities.” 288   William Jennings Bryan himself, defending 
himself against allegations of bad faith, put it so: 
Our refusal to recognize the rights of the Filipinos to self-government will 
embarrass us if we express sympathy with those in other lands who are struggling 
to follow the doctrines set forth in the Declaration of Independence…Suppose we 
sent our sympathy to the Boers?  In an hour England would send back, ‘What 
about the Filipinos?289 
 
 The South African War was useful as a cudgel to bash the Republicans.  It was 
useful as a prism on to which concerns about America’s identity and position in the world 
could be introduced and debated.  But as a political cause in which the United States 
should actually entangle itself?  That was the least important of its three purposes.  
Despite the tireless efforts of the many Americans involved in pro-Republikeinse 
activism between 1899 and 1902, the movement was unable to close that part of the deal. 
——— 
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 Of course, as pro-Republikeinse activists never tired of saying, America’s choice 
in the South African War was not between acting and not acting.  The American 
government’s indirect impact on the South African War, by not making a fuss about it, 
was important to ultimate British success.  Another key phenomenon, one that became 
one of the parting codas of the war, was America’s economic support of the British along 
with the issue of the Chalmette depot, a scandal that never was. 
 By January 1901 76,632 horses and mules had been shipped from American ports 
to South Africa, and by early 1902 the pro-Republikeinse American Transvaal League 
estimated that over 150,000 had gone over, alongside hired American muleteers (many of 
whom, activists alleged, were pressed into service with the British army upon arrival in 
Africa, against the terms of their contracts).290  At the port of Chalmette, Louisiana, near 
New Orleans, the British bought up “disused cotton sheds,” and staffed them as depots 
for the mass transport of American livestock to South Africa.291  Due to an astonishing 
mortality rate among horses and mules brought to Africa, the British army’s need for 
both stock and caretakers was nearly insatiable.  By April 1900 Consul Stowe at Cape 
Town estimated that there were several hundred American muleteers in southern Africa, 
                                                 
290
 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Transmitting, in Reply to a Resolution of the House, a Statement as to the Exportation of Horses, Mules, 
and Supplies to South Africa, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., February 28th, 1901, H.R. Doc. 498, serial 4167: 1; John 
C. Williams, “Is Our Government Violating the Treaty of Washington and Thus Giving Uncalled For Aid 
to Great Britain in its Unrighteous War Against the Boers?”  U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Report and Accompanying 
Papers Concerning Shipments of Horses, Mules and Other Supplies from Louisiana to the Seat of War in 
South Africa, 57th Cong., 1st sess., April 17th, 1902, H.R. Doc. 568, serial 4377: 14.  Wassermann gives a 
total of 143,755 mules shipped between September 1899 and June 1902; Changuion gives 191,402; Consul 
J.G. Stowe estimated that there were 500 American muleteers in southern Africa in April 1900.  See  Johan 
Wassermann, “A Tale of Two Port Cities: The Relationship Between New Orleans and Durban During the 
Boer War,” Historia 49.1 (2004): 28; Changuion, Uncle Sam, Oom Paul, en John Bull, 191; Mulanax, The 
Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy, 93. 
291
 Wassermann, “A Tale of Two Port Cities,” 28. 




most of whom were stationed at Durban, close to the front.292  Since at least one caretaker 
was needed for every twenty mules (and every fifteen horses), British recruitment efforts 
for American muleteers were aggressive, and—in the eyes of critics—deeply suspicious.  
According to Johan Wassermann, British recruiters relied heavily on the victims of 
1890’s American industrialization: the “adventurers, drifters, petty criminals, 
troublemakers, corner boys, jailbirds and the ‘dead brokes’ of America.”293  Sometimes 
they were alleged to prey on innocents. In February 1902, the would-be Transvaal consul 
Samuel Pearson accused the British of running an illegal military base at Chalmette, and 
attempted to bring the issue to court to force the question.  The effort seemed hopelessly 
quixotic, until the end of March, when the governor of Louisiana unexpectedly 
complained to Secretary Hay.294  Pearson’s efforts did not comfort everyone.  In what is 
surely one of the strangest letters in the records of Cape Town’s American consulate, 
Mrs. T.J. Turner expressed grave concern for her younger brother Fred, who 
mysteriously disappeared the weeks before Christmas last and we have every 
reason to believe he was unduly influenced to join the British army, which was 
recruiting at or near  N.O. La.  He left Indianapolis about  the last of August 
with another boy of his own age (16 years) to make the “grand tour” and we did 
not hear of him until December, when he wrote mama that he was in the employ 
of a Milwaukee Detective Association, locating Blind Tigers [illegal saloons] of 
which that part of the country abounds. He said furthermore this association was 
sending boys to England and South Africa….I see the U.S. is going to take steps 
to abolish the camp in La., but that does not help us in this case.295 
 
What might have become a difficult moment for the Roosevelt administration was 
happily interrupted by the end of the war on May 31st, 1902. 
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 The Treaty of Vereeniging, which ended the South African War, was a 
disappointment to Republikeinse boosters in the United States.  In it, the Orange Free 
State and South African Republic were stripped of their sovereignty and placed on a track 
towards union with the Cape Colony and Natal.  Africa south of the Zambezi was fully 
British, the landscape of the country was devastated, its people were in misery, and the 
sturdy Republikeinse burghers had been forced to yield to British might.  The overall 
picture would seem grim for those who believed with Richard Harding Davis that the 
burghers embodied all the best and most threatened qualities of true-blue American stock.   
 In the long run, however, they had little reason to despair.  British attempts to 
further inundate the former republics with English-speaking immigrants failed miserably, 
and to this day English-speakers have never constituted a majority of the white 
population in South Africa.  The much anticipated Anglicization of the country never 
occurred.  When the Union of South Africa was finally formed in 1910 as a dominion of 
the British Empire, its first prime minister was the former Free State general Louis Botha.  
Its second premier was the guerrilla fighter Jan Smuts.   
 African American leaders who suspected both Briton and burgher of fecklessness 
regarding the black population would regrettably find their suspicions confirmed.  In 
many ways the treaty of Vereeniging was not so much a Republikeinse surrender as a 
blueprint for continued white supremacy.  The liberal Cape Colony’s franchise laws were 
not extended to the former republics, as many black Africans and African Americans had 
cautiously hoped.  The foundations were being laid for something quite different.  A little 
over a decade after the war, Maurice Evans, a Natal colonial official, took a fact-finding 




trip to the American South, and returned excited by the opportunities for innovation a 
new Union of South Africa would offer to tackling the race question.  His book Black 
and White in the Southern States makes for chilling reading in light of South Africa’s 
subsequent development.  “The wisest friends of the American Negro,” according to 
Evans, 
after all these years would welcome a separation of the races such as is still 
possible for us in South Africa…We still have black States…and yet short-sighted 
ones would break them up, and force the landless inhabitants to become 
vagabonds or industrial serfs, scattered throughout the length and breadth of the 
land.   
To such the experience of the South should serve as a warning…I frankly 
recognize the difference of the races and believe we must accept this in our 
practice.  I advocate territorial separation, the conservation of what is good in 
native life and custom, and the gradual teaching of what they can assimilate from 
our civilization… 
Too late it may be for the South, but I feel that if some of her best 
men…could counsel us, they would say that on such lines and not in the way it 
was forced upon them by the conquering North, lies our hope for the future of 
South Africa.296 
 
 Certain questions were still a long way from being resolved. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the war, proposals flooded state legislatures across 
America proposing schemes from resettling defeated Republikeinse emigrants on 
American soil.  Though Transvaal State Secretary F.W. Reitz exiled himself to the United 
States for a time, and a small burgher settlement in Patagonia would hang on for several 
decades, the anticipated Second Great Trek out of South Africa never occurred.  The ever 
widening freedoms of dominion status meant that even former Republikeinse who 
despised the British had a reasonable expectation of one day taking full control of the 
state, just as they did, in relatively short order.  The sky did not fall on southern Africa as 
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a result of the gruesome 1899-1902 war.  Unfortunately, the sun did not exactly rise 
either. 
 As Thomas Noer, Richard Hull and others have effectively shown, American 
hopes of expansion into the southern African marketplace were largely disappointed over 
the coming years, as Britain licked its wounds in the region and acted to defend its 
imperial interests.  One coda to this story, however, is worth mentioning: the South 
African War Exhibition, a “historical libretto” performed at the 1904 World’s Fair in St. 
Louis, Missouri.  An ambitious and cumbersome project, the exhibition brought a 
dizzying array of actual veterans from both sides to the United States (including the 
famous Republikeinse generals Piet Cronjé and Ben Viljoen), in addition to 
Republikeinse women and children, and 40 black Africans.  The event sought to recreate 
the spectacle of the war while it was still fresh in the minds of Americans, but it had a 
subtler purpose as well: the need to project an image of white reconciliation that would 
resonate with America’s own post-Civil War project.  Notwithstanding the decisions of 
the Colonial Office and the British Parliament, Jennie Sutton argues that the “Transvaal 
Spectacle” projected an image of stable white supremacy that organizers hoped would 
foster future ties between the two regions.297  Both Briton and Rebublikeinse were invited 
to relive their best days of valor (through re-enactments of Colenso and Paardeburg, 
respectively), and fly their flags together at the performance’s conclusion.  Echoes of the 
American Civil War pervaded the Exhibition.  Just as writers and activists had worked 
tirelessly to fit the South African War to American templates while it was still raging, in 
its conclusion the organizers of the re-enactment staged a second Appomattox.  “You 
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have made a gallant fight, sir!” a British re-enactor would say to the real General Cronjé, 
“I am glad to get so brave a man.”298  Given all that occurred in America between 1899 
and 1902, it seems only fitting that the South African War, though so very foreign, should 
be made to end at home. 
 Because for most Americans the South African War was more of a mirror onto 
themselves than something demanding action for its own sake, the situation there did not 
remain on the minds of most Americans for long.  A new century had dawned, and the 
fact that world power status had fundamentally changed America was slowly sinking in.  
The nation was soon off to bigger and better things.  Within its own moment, though, the 
South African War remains a fascinating event in American history.  Never before had 
Americans become interested so quickly in a conflict so unfamiliar.  Perhaps never before 
had a wholly foreign conflict become such fertile metaphorical ground for discussing the 
anxieties and ambiguities of the American story.  Perhaps never before had an activist 
movement both risen and fallen on such a ground.  To be sure, the vast majority of 
Americans did not come anywhere close to experiencing the South African War as it was.  
But millions of people west of the Atlantic experienced America’s South African War—a 
war of competing discourses, comparisons, metaphors and methods.  A war that for a 
brief but significant historical moment, cradled the self-understood destiny of the 
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